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REGULATING REAL-WORLD SURVEILLANCE 
Margot E. Kaminski* 
Abstract: A number of laws govern information gathering, or surveillance, by private 
parties in the physical world. But we lack a compelling theory of privacy harm that accounts 
for the state’s interest in enacting these laws. Without a theory of privacy harm, these laws 
will be enacted piecemeal. Legislators will have a difficult time justifying the laws to 
constituents; the laws will not be adequately tailored to legislative interest; and courts will 
find it challenging to weigh privacy harms against other strong values, such as freedom of 
expression. 
This Article identifies the government interest in enacting laws governing surveillance by 
private parties. Using social psychologist Irwin Altman’s framework of “boundary 
management” as a jumping-off point, I conceptualize privacy harm as interference in an 
individual’s ability to dynamically manage disclosure and social boundaries. Stemming from 
this understanding of privacy, the government has two related interests in enacting laws 
prohibiting surveillance: an interest in providing notice so that an individual can adjust her 
behavior; and an interest in prohibiting surveillance to prevent undesirable behavioral shifts. 
Framing the government interest, or interests, this way has several advantages. First, it 
descriptively maps on to existing laws: These laws either help individuals manage their 
desired level of disclosure by requiring notice, or prevent individuals from resorting to 
undesirable behavioral shifts by banning surveillance. Second, the framework helps us assess 
the strength and legitimacy of the legislative interest in these laws. Third, it allows courts to 
understand how First Amendment interests are in fact internalized in privacy laws. And 
fourth, it provides guidance to legislators for the enactment of new laws governing a range of 
new surveillance technologies—from automated license plate readers (ALPRs) to robots to 
drones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is situated; it exists in context. That context can have 
physical, social, and temporal dimensions. While a growing number of 
scholars have discussed the importance of context to surveillance online, 
it often gets neglected in the physical world.
1
 Courts oversimplify 
                                                     
1. For explorations of context online, see, for example, HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (outlining 
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for 
Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing online privacy as relative levels of 
obscurity); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 
(2005) (discussing the social context of disclosure online); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on 
the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 
(2011) (discussing cloud computing and social networking as technosocial extensions of real spaces 
like the home). 
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physical context, characterizing a situation as private if it takes place in 
the home, and public if it takes place outside. But in practice, 
surveillance subjects in the physical world rely on and use detailed 
temporal, social, and physical features of their environment when 
calculating their ideal degree of disclosure to others at a given moment. 
When the introduction of new surveillance technologies undermines 
features of the physical environment that people once relied on in 
calculating their degree of privacy or openness, the state may intervene. 
For example, celebrities once relied on physical distance and physical 
walls to keep out snooping paparazzi. When paparazzi started using 
visual and auditory enhancing technologies to overcome both distance 
and walls, California enacted a paparazzi law to protect individuals from 
a “constructive invasion of privacy” through the use of a “visual or 
auditory enhancing device.”2 In 2014, California amended this law to 
expand its coverage to constructive privacy intrusions by “any device” in 
order to reach aerial surveillance by drones.
3
 
Surveillance technologies from video cameras to drones have inspired 
the enactment of a number of laws governing surveillance by private 
parties in real physical space. These laws have received surprisingly 
little in-depth analysis as a category.
4
 This Article brings these laws 
together under one umbrella and proposes a way to understand the 
government’s interest in enacting them. 
The government has an interest in protecting privacy. But merely 
                                                     
2. See Act of Sept. 30, 1998, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1000 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1708.8(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). 
3. See Assemb. 2306, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_2301-2350/ab_2306_bill_20140930_chaptered.pdf; DL 
Cade, California Updates Invasion of Privacy Law to Ban the Use of Camera Drones, PETAPIXEL 
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://petapixel.com/2014/10/14/california-passes-law-banning-drones-protect-
general-publics-privacy/.  
4. A number of these laws have been addressed as individual topics. See, e.g., Jesse Harlan 
Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping 
Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Policy Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
487 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Privacy From Technological Intrusions, 1999 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 183 (2000); Michael Potere, Comment, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens 
Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (2012); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches 
the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 389 (2012); Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and 
Public Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (2010). 
Several scholars have addressed image capture more holistically, but from a First Amendment 
perspective. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014); Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Producing Speech, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011). 
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identifying the government interest in surveillance laws as an interest in 
privacy protection is inadequate because privacy can mean many 
different things. The understanding of privacy behind legislation can 
greatly affect the scope of that legislation, and the ability of the 
government to justify it to constituents and in court. 
This Article asks what theory of privacy drives the government to 
protect individuals from having information about them gathered by 
private, nongovernmental actors. Without a theoretical understanding of 
why these laws exist, arguments over whether they should exist at all 
will continue to be had on a case-by-case basis. This has led to 
piecemeal legal protection.
5
 Legislators will find it easier to decide when 
such laws are necessary if they can better identify and discuss the 
government interests at stake. Understanding the government interest is 
crucial for making decisions about both when to enact these laws, and 
when these laws can withstand balancing against other values, such as 
freedom of expression. 
In the 1970s, social psychologist Irwin Altman conceived of privacy 
as boundary management:
6
 the process of dynamically managing the 
degree of disclosure of one’s self to others. Privacy is not a single state 
of being; it is a process of calibration set in physical, social, and 
temporal space. Altman’s great insight is that when a physical space 
changes, a person’s ideal degree of disclosure does not necessarily 
change with it. So if a wall functionally disappears because of a new 
surveillance technology, a person who once relied on it for protection 
from disclosure may now start changing her behavior, to maintain the 
same desired degree of disclosure that existed when the wall protected 
her. 
Building on this conception of privacy, this Article proposes that the 
government has a two-pronged interest in enacting surveillance laws to 
govern private actors. First, it has an interest in providing notice to 
individuals, both to let them recalibrate their ideal level of disclosure and 
to encourage governance of surveillance through social norms. Second, 
the government has an interest in preserving some situations as 
surveillance-free, to prevent undesirable behavioral shifts. 
Understanding the government interest this way descriptively maps 
                                                     
5. Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in 
Public, 17 J.L. & PHIL. 559, 565 (1998) (observing that “the absence of a clearly articulated 
philosophical base is not of theoretical interest only, but is at least partially responsible for the 
inconsistencies, discontinuities and fragmentation, and incompleteness in the framework of legal 
protections and in public and corporate policy”). 
6. See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975). 
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on to the laws legislators have in fact been enacting. A number of 
surveillance laws provide notice to an individual so she can optimize 
disclosure calibration, while other laws preserve certain situations as 
surveillance-free. Understanding the government interest in surveillance 
laws as an interest in boundary management should enable legislators to 
thoughtfully enact new laws and enable courts to better assess the 
strength of the privacy interest at stake. 
The privacy interests at stake in these laws will soon be weighed 
against an interest in free speech.
7
 Courts will soon need to assess 
surveillance laws for their compatibility with freedom of expression, as 
courts of appeals recognize a burgeoning First Amendment “right to 
record.”8 While the outcome of this balancing is outside the scope of this 
Article, a theory of the privacy interest at stake in surveillance laws can 
help courts assess when the interest is strongest, and when it is weaker. 
It can also help courts identify when privacy protection in fact enhances 
First Amendment interests, rather than conflicts with them. This Article 
shows that First Amendment interests are often internalized on the 
privacy side of the equation. Protecting privacy does not always conflict 
with the First Amendment; privacy protection often enables expression. 
This Article begins by identifying technologies governed by 
surveillance laws, ranging from cameras to cellphones to drones to 
robots. It discusses several theoretical understandings of privacy, which 
have been used to describe the government interest in privacy 
lawmaking. It outlines Altman’s theory of privacy as boundary 
management, and explains the government interests that the boundary 
management framework reveals. It addresses potential criticisms of the 
boundary management framework, and then identifies its benefits, 
including descriptive accuracy illustrated through a number of existing 
laws. 
As new surveillance technologies increasingly come into public use, 
legislators will look to laws of the past to govern privacy problems of 
                                                     
7. In a forthcoming Article, I discuss the First Amendment side of this equation. A draft version 
of this forthcoming Article was workshopped at the 2015 Freedom of Expression Scholars 
Conference at Yale Law School. Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record 
(forthcoming 2016) (formerly titled Context, Barriers, and the Right to Record). 
8. A number of courts of appeals have recently recognized a “right to record.” See Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 
83 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government 
officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts.”); Kelly 
v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 
1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, 
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police 
conduct.”). 
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the very near future. Drones—with their ability to record individuals in 
public, from new vantage points, and at lower cost—are one technology 
driving the enactment of new privacy laws. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has proposed its rules for commercial use of 
drones, and those rules are less restrictive than expected.
9
 In the absence 
of a federal privacy regime, states will enact new laws to govern private 
parties’ use of drones as a recording technology. This Article puts these 
laws in historical and theoretical context, and provides guidance for the 
enactment of future laws. 
I. TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES INSPIRE 
LEGAL EVOLUTION 
Privacy laws are driven by social and technological change. As 
technologies evolve, legislators enact new laws. This Part gives an 
overview of some techno-social evolutions that have inspired the 
enactment of laws governing surveillance by private parties. 
When Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their seminal article 
on privacy in 1890, they were spurred by the fear of ubiquitous, intrusive 
recording devices: cameras.
10
 Cheap, portable cameras could 
surreptitiously capture portraits and other private information. Warren 
and Brandeis were also motivated by social change. Popular journalism 
was booming, and there was a growing market for gossip.
11
 This 
combination of social and technological change spurred Warren and 
Brandeis to propose a privacy right of action. 
Other technological and social change inspired other laws. Morse’s 
first telegraph was sent in 1844
12
 and Edison’s telephone was improved 
                                                     
9. Aaron Cooper, FAA Proposes to Allow Commercial Drone Use, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/15/politics/drones-faa-rules-commercial-flights/ (last updated Feb. 15, 
2015, 3:00 PM). The President recently ordered the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration to engage in standards-setting around a voluntary privacy standard for commercial 
drone use by U.S. companies. BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: PROMOTING 
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS WHILE SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN DOMESTIC USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2015), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-
competitiveness-while-safegua. 
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890) (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction 
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”). 
11. Id. at 196. Warren and Brandeis refer to an intrusive press “overstepping . . . bounds of 
propriety and of decency.” Id. 
12. LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE’S INVENTION AND ITS PREDECESSORS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 32 (1993). 
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in 1877.
13
 Wiretapping and bugging technologies were developed shortly 
thereafter; the first police wiretap was in 1890.
14
 These technologies, and 
the widespread adoption of the telephone, eventually drove the 
enactment of both state and federal privacy wiretapping and 
eavesdropping laws.
15
 
A number of newer technologies enable sense-enhancement or super-
human-like powers. Infrared sensors, heat sensors, and new powerful 
radar systems all allow people (mainly police) to “see” through walls.16 
Facial recognition and automated license plate readers enable the large-
scale capture of information, tracking of individuals and their vehicles, 
and correlation of that information with information housed in massive 
databases.
17
 Widespread adoption of Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technology has also driven extensive legal debate, culminating in a 
recent Supreme Court case and state laws.
18
 Mobile carriers also track 
cellphone user movements, and “stingrays” or cell site simulators allow 
operators to directly access the location of cell phone users by 
mimicking cell towers.
19
 Cell site tracking has received legislative and 
                                                     
13. GEORGE B. PRESCOTT, BELL’S ELECTRIC SPEAKING TELEPHONE: ITS INVENTION, 
CONSTRUCTION, APPLICATION, MODIFICATION AND HISTORY iv (1884). 
14. For a history of wiretapping, see generally JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE (1994); WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE 
POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION (1998); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING 
PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995); ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN 
FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 
(2000). 
15. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (2012)); Act of March 25, 1987, 1986 Ohio 
Laws 457 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51–.59 (West, Westlaw through 
2015)).  
16. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (holding that police use of thermal imaging to 
“see” into a house was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. 
Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the government brought with it a 
Doppler radar device capable of detecting from outside the home the presence of ‘human breathing 
and movement within’”); Brad Heath, New Police Radars Can “See” Inside Homes, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 20, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/01/19/police-radar-see-
throughwalls/22007615/.  
17. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: 
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 410 (2012) (explaining that 
uses of facial recognition technologies “range from confirming targets for elimination and pairing 
photographs and data from different databases, to monitoring individuals as they move through 
public space”). 
18. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); H.R. 0603, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mont. 2013). 
19. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/maps/stingray-
tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
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judicial attention.
20
 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, have shrunk in size, 
and lowered in cost in the past few years.
21
 The increase in small drone 
use by hobbyists, and anticipated increase in drone use by commercial 
entities, has inspired states to enact a number of laws governing 
information capture by drones.
22
 Drones are cheaper than helicopters, 
easier to operate, and provide a different vantage point than cellphone 
cameras. They also can capture information continuously, rather than at 
the behest of a user. 
The much-anticipated rise of the Internet of Things—that is, a range 
of interconnected devices with sensors in the home, such as smart 
refrigerators—may inspire a range of new privacy laws. The Internet of 
Things will place eyes in the home, and create far more pervasive 
surveillance than exists even with today’s extensive cellphone usage. 
Household robots may eventually raise similar privacy challenges, 
giving third party companies a window into locations to which they 
never had access.
23
 As discussed at greater length in Part V.D., robots 
may also create new challenges due to anthropomorphic 
characteristics.
24
 People may end up trusting their robots, caring for 
them, and consequently revealing more information than they would to a 
threatening-looking camera. 
II. THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND INFORMATION GATHERING 
In reaction to new technologies, states have enacted a range of laws 
governing surveillance in the physical environment.
25
 Some of these 
                                                     
20. See, e.g., Annabelle Steinhacker & Rubin Sinins, New Jersey High Court Correctly Rules 
Cell Phone Locations Are Constitutionally Protected, JURIST (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:17 PM), 
http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/10/steinhacker-sinins-NJ-cell-tracking.php. 
21. See Hearing on Using Unmanned Aerial Systems Within the Homeland: Security Game 
Changer?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, & Mgmt. of the H. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony and statement of Amie Stepanovich, Association 
Litigation Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Stepanovich.pdf. 
22. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst.  
23. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015). 
24. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); 
Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots (April 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2044797 (arguing that because 
people tend to anthropomorphize robots, we should consider granting some kinds of legal 
protections to robots). 
25. See infra Part V.A. 
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laws criminalize surveillance, while others provide a private right of 
action. These laws can be characterized as restrictions or prohibitions on 
surveillance; they govern the act by which information is collected.
26
 But 
the government does not have a uniform interest in preventing all private 
information gathering, and diverse government interests are reflected in 
the diversity of the laws. The laws are tailored to particular technologies, 
such as zoom lenses, or to protect against particular harms, such as 
listening in on and recording a conversation. This suggests that 
legislatures understand that there is a range of government interests in 
preventing private actor surveillance. 
Historically, a number of surveillance laws have been aimed at 
intrusive behavior by the media or others. These laws have been subject 
to little theoretical analysis for two reasons. First, the quintessential 
prohibition on private-actor surveillance is one of the oldest, best-
established, and least-challenged privacy laws: the privacy tort of 
intrusion upon seclusion.
27
 Second, most recent theorizing around 
privacy has addressed the puzzles raised by big data, focusing on what 
restrictions to place on data processing, not the moment at which data 
are gathered.
28
 But many data analytics companies are now pursuing 
business models that rely on actively gathering information in the 
physical world rather than using information provided by others or 
gathered online.
29
 This brings legislators back to the older question of 
how to govern surveillance, or information gathering, that takes place in 
the physical world. 
The earliest such laws—the eavesdropping nuisance, Peeping Tom 
laws, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion—could be justified as 
protecting a very modest understanding of privacy: privacy as physical 
withdrawal from the world. These early laws at their essence protect 
agreed-upon private spaces. While intrusion upon seclusion can be 
applied outside of the home, courts have often struggled in its 
                                                     
26. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 10–11, 106–07, 161–64 (2008) (classifying 
such laws as governing information collection by surveillance and intrusion). 
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
28. Helen Nissenbaum, Woodrow Hartzog, Danielle Citron, and Frank Pasquale, to name only a 
few, have been writing in this area. See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 1; Danielle Keats Citron & 
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 1. 
29. For example, some private companies use license plate readers to create databases that they 
then sell to other companies and law enforcement. See, e.g., Steve Orr, License Plate Data Is Big 
Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2014/11/02/license-plate-data-is-big-business/18370791/. 
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application, and repeatedly avowed that there is no privacy in public.
30
 
A number of scholars have offered new theories of privacy, in 
contrast to this idea of privacy as complete withdrawal from the public 
world.
31
 Because conceiving of privacy as withdrawal fails to account 
for any expectation of privacy in public, these scholars saw a need to 
develop a theory of privacy harm that could justify protection of privacy 
outside of the home. Thus they devised newer theories of privacy to 
justify the protection of privacy in public. But these theories neglect to 
link protection of privacy in public to protection of privacy in private, 
ignoring justifiable intuitions that there is a strong government interest in 
protecting against surveillance conducted in private places. In other 
words, to escape the public-private binary, they disembody privacy from 
the physical environment. This is a mistake. 
This Part begins by discussing courts’ frequent conceptualization of 
private and public as opposites, or a binary, with no overlap in between. 
It then turns to several of the scholars who have re-theorized privacy to 
address governance of privacy in public. It concludes by examining the 
limitations of these newer privacy theories as applied to information-
gathering laws. 
A. Privacy as Withdrawal into Private Spaces 
Intrusion upon seclusion protects a particularly uncontroversial vision 
of privacy, one that is clearly understandable to most people: privacy as 
solitude or withdrawal. Not much ink needs to be spilled arguing for a 
theory of privacy harm that permits governments to protect individuals 
from having their solitude disrupted.
32
 If you understand the purpose of 
privacy protection to be to protect an individual’s ability to withdraw to 
private spaces, then the intrusion tort intuitively makes sense. 
                                                     
30. See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970) (“[I]t is 
manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion 
of his privacy.”); Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 
8, 2006) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for a privacy claim over art 
photographs taken in a public street); McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 
904 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding no invasion of privacy and strong First Amendment interests “[w]hen 
an individual is photographed at a public place for a newsworthy article and that photograph is 
published”); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1988) (“[T]here is no liability for 
the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff . . . . [Or] for observing him or even 
taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway . . . .” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c. (1977))); Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 
(Ct. App. 1990) (finding of filming in a public street that any invasion of privacy was “extremely de 
minimis”). 
31. See infra notes 61–67. 
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
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In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis called for the law to 
recognize a general right to privacy. They famously described privacy as 
the “right to be let alone.”33 But Warren and Brandeis’s view of privacy 
was expansive—perhaps too expansive—protecting not just the right to 
be physically alone when desired, but the right to an “inviolate 
personality” from the “too enterprising press, the photographer, or the 
possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing 
scenes or sounds.”34 This more expansive view of privacy included a 
right to control the extent to which one’s information was publicized, 
which raises First Amendment problems. But the core understanding of 
privacy as a right to be let alone is relatively uncontroversial. 
Following the Warren and Brandeis Article, U.S. courts recognized a 
variety of privacy actions. In 1960, torts scholar William Prosser 
famously categorized some 300-plus suits arising from Warren and 
Brandeis’s right to privacy as four torts: intrusion upon seclusion; public 
disclosure of private fact; false light; and appropriation.
35
 Before 
Prosser’s taxonomy, there was more variety in litigation but less national 
coverage; states recognized more causes of action, but fewer states 
recognized privacy torts.
36
 Now nearly every state recognizes Prosser’s 
four privacy torts.
37
 But the spread of Prosser’s torts also “fossilized” the 
development of U.S. privacy law, restricting the development of other 
related causes of action, like breach of confidence.
38
 
Prosser’s taxonomy has been much criticized. Some criticism arises 
from the tension between the disclosure torts and freedom of speech—a 
tension Prosser himself recognized.
39
 Penalizing information distribution 
runs headlong into protection of free speech. Others criticize the Prosser 
taxonomy as failing to reach privacy problems of the information age.
40
 
                                                     
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193. 
34. Id. at 205–06. 
35. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
36. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1887, 1895, 1913 (2010) (pointing out that by the time of Prosser’s Article, only a minority of 
states recognized privacy torts, but that the breadth of the understanding of privacy “germinated 
countless new torts to redress a variety of related yet distinct harms”). 
37. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (observing that 
every state but North Dakota and Wyoming recognizes the privacy torts in either statute or at 
common law). 
38. Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1904 (“[W]hile Prosser gave tort privacy a legitimacy it 
had previously lacked, he also fossilized it and eliminated its capacity to change and develop.”). 
39. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 365 
(2011) (discussing the tension between disclosure torts and the First Amendment). 
40. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1810 (2010); 
Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1889. 
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The Prosser torts do, in practice, enforce a limited conception of 
privacy.
41
 Courts have tended to rely on a privacy binary: information is 
either withdrawn and thus private, or available to others and thus 
public.
42
 Once information is shared with others under this rubric, it can 
no longer be protected as private. 
While some courts appear to recognize a more contextualized 
understanding of privacy—for example, a court found that a person’s 
HIV status could still be considered private information even though it 
had been shared with more than sixty people
43—that contextualized 
understanding often relies on the sensitivity of the type of information at 
issue. If information is health information, or related to the naked body, 
or otherwise falls into a category of information courts recognize as 
inherently sensitive, then sharing that information with other people or 
being in a public space does not necessarily make the information non-
private in nature.
44
 
The intrusion upon seclusion tort exemplifies the privacy binary: 
liability arises when individuals transgress into a private space.
45
 It is 
possible for intrusion to take place in public, because “there may be 
some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that 
are not exhibited to the public gaze.”46 But many courts afford no 
liability, for example, for an image captured on a public street.
47
 Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence until very recently echoed this reasoning: “A 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”48 While some courts have adopted a more nuanced view, until 
                                                     
41. Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1920 (observing that in applying the Prosser torts, 
“courts have relied upon antiquated and narrow understandings of privacy. . . . ‘There can be no 
privacy in that which is already public’” (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1953))). 
42. Id. (noting that “privacy becomes an all-or-nothing affair, something that makes privacy 
virtually impossible in today’s world where it is increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to keep 
much information completely hidden away”). 
43. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
44. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (protecting as private 
a woman’s underwear when her skirt flew up at a funhouse ride). 
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (explaining that liability arises only 
when individuals violate private space or private seclusion). 
46. Id. 
47. See generally supra note 30. 
48. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 
450–51 (1989) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy where a greenhouse was visible by 
helicopter from navigable airspace 400 feet in the air); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–
41 (1988) (“[H]aving deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection 
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very recently, the Supreme Court has tended to address privacy through 
this binary framework.
49
 
The historic tendency to view privacy and publicity in a binary 
framework runs broader than the application of the privacy torts. In both 
legal and political theory, the terms “private” and “public” often mark a 
dichotomy, rather than ends on a spectrum.
50
 The private sphere is 
personal, intimate, even familial, while the public sphere usually 
involves civic participation and governance. 
Within this binary, privacy can be, and often is, demarcated along 
physical lines. People withdraw to private spaces; hence U.S. privacy 
jurisprudence repeatedly recognizes the special nature of the home.
51
 Or 
the private-public binary can instead focus on the kind of information at 
issue, requiring protection for intimate or sensitive information.
52
 But 
neither understanding of privacy—as protecting privileged spaces, or 
protecting privileged information—accounts for protection of privacy in 
ordinary information incidentally revealed outside the home. 
In fact, the revelation of ordinary information outside of the home is 
often used in both privacy jurisprudence and in philosophical debates as 
the easily dismissed pole of the privacy-publicity binary.
53
 Even those 
                                                     
and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take 
it,’ respondents could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they 
discarded.” (citation omitted)); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy where marijuana plants were visible from 1000 feet in the air); 
United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[S]hredding garbage and placing it in the 
public domain subjects it to the same risks regarding privacy, as engaging in a private conversation 
in public where it is subject to the possibility that it may be overheard by other persons. Both are 
failed attempts at maintaining privacy whose failure can only be attributed to the conscious 
acceptance by the actor of obvious risk factors.”). But see United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (finding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for applying a GPS 
tracker to a car).  
49. Id. State constitutions have been found, by contrast, to protect privacy even in public spaces. 
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 276–77, 76 P.3d 217, 231 (2003) (Washington State 
Supreme Court protecting against remote GPS tracking); State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 581, 
800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990) (finding a valid privacy interest in trash). 
50. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 584. 
51. Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(distinguishing Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)); see also Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 10, at 202 n.1 (noting that English courts held sacred the right to privacy 
within the home). 
52. See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
53. See, e.g., Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 271, 281 (1977) 
(defining privacy as an “island of personal autonomy” limited to the “intimacies of personal 
identity”); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 271 (1983) 
(stating that all other information “cannot without glaring paradox be called private”). Nissenbaum 
calls this the “normative knock-down argument.” Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 575, 587. 
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advancing a more complex understanding of privacy will concede that 
privacy “does not assert a right never to be seen even on a crowded 
street.”54 That concession, however, has come under significant scrutiny 
recently, in both scholarship and jurisprudence. 
B. Privacy in Public 
Evolving technology has driven a parallel evolution in legal 
understandings of privacy in public.
55
 The simple public phone booth 
forced the Supreme Court to re-evaluate its earlier conclusion that 
privacy would be protected only in the home. The Court instead delinked 
privacy protection from trespass, and devised its Fourth Amendment 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, also known as the Katz test.56 
Cellular telephones and their ability to cheaply and easily film and 
photograph activity in public have driven the enactment of voyeurism 
laws.
57
 Now drones and their ability to achieve perspectives once 
attainable only by aircraft or crane have driven states to enactment drone 
privacy laws.
58
 
Scholars have proposed competing theories of privacy to push back 
against the binary conceptualization of information as either completely 
withdrawn, or completely available. Often, these competing 
conceptualizations have been used to address the question of privacy in 
public. 
There is considerable support for why information revealed in public 
should be protected from government surveillance. Extensive 
surveillance can produce both conformity and anxiety.
59
 When the 
government wields public surveillance as a tool, this shifts the balance of 
power between citizens and government, and makes citizens less able to 
effect democratic change.
60
 Under a variety of constitutional 
justifications—stemming from both the Fourth Amendment and the First 
Amendment—it can be argued that ordinary activities performed in 
                                                     
54. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 44 (1976).  
55. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 576. 
56. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012). 
58. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 57–59 (2013); Calo, supra note 22. 
59. Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications 
of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 483–93 (2014). 
60. Id.; see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–52 (2002). 
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public should be protected from government surveillance.
61
 
However, when private citizens conduct surveillance on other private 
citizens, the question of privacy harm becomes more complicated. 
Surveillance by private actors poses the challenge of balancing 
individual rights.
62
 A subject’s right to be free from surveillance comes 
into conflict with the right of the observer to gather information, or to 
merely observe and remember.
63
 A more precise explanation of public 
privacy harms is necessary; one capable of distinguishing between 
different degrees of harm. 
One way to understand privacy harms involving information gathered 
in public is to look to harms associated with data use—that is, private-
sector data-mining. Writing about privacy in public, Helen Nissenbaum 
explained that “people have a robust sense of the information about them 
that is relevant, appropriate, or proper to particular circumstances, 
situations, or relationships.”64 They choose to reveal information under 
particular circumstances, expecting that it will not travel beyond those 
settings. 
The privacy harm occurs when information is decontextualized, and 
moved into another setting despite norms suggesting it will not be 
moved. Nissenbaum argued that this theory of what she terms 
“contextual integrity” is critical to understanding why we should protect 
privacy in public.
65
 Nissenbaum explains that privacy, understood as 
contextual integrity, is crucial to the ability to “define the nature and 
degree of closeness of relationships,” which in turn is “an important 
aspect of personal autonomy.”66 
Nissenbaum’s characterization of information privacy as contextual 
integrity has been a particularly influential alternative to the privacy 
                                                     
61. Slobogin, supra note 60, at 252–72. See generally David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A 
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name 
Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815 (2013); Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). 
62. Kaminski, supra note 58, at 62–63; Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 571 (“[P]rotecting privacy 
for one person inevitably leads to restraints on the freedom of another or others, or may even result 
in harms to them.”). 
63. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, 
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011). See generally Bambauer, supra note 
4. 
64. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 581. 
65. Id. at 21. 
66. Id. at 22. 
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binary.
67
 The theory of contextual integrity currently plays a crucial role 
in policy conversations about big data and privacy; the May 2014 White 
House Report on Big Data refers to the idea of a “no surprises” rule for 
data use.
68
 Data should not be used out of context in a way that would 
surprise the data subject. And there are portions of U.S. jurisprudence 
that support contextual integrity as an applied theory.
69
 
But a theory of privacy as contextual integrity focuses on the 
processing of data rather than the gathering of it. Contextual integrity 
emphasizes concerns over shifting information from one context to 
another, and collating information to reveal patterns.
70
 Surveillance in 
public is problematic under this rubric because it enables both 
decontextualization and collation; but surveillance by itself is not 
necessarily problematic in the absence of data use. Contextual integrity 
thus poses a strong argument for why information revealed in public 
should not be moved or manipulated, but only secondarily explains why 
it should not be gathered in the first place. 
When it comes to evaluating existing surveillance laws, contextual 
integrity is not descriptively accurate, and struggles as a guide for 
legislators. Descriptively, many of the laws governing private 
information gathering do not address either decontextualization or 
collation; they often don’t discuss data use or misuse.71 They focus 
instead on the moment of information collection itself. As a guide for 
new legislation, contextual integrity is challenging. Legislators would 
have to either delegate heavily to courts to determine when a “surprise” 
about data use is problematic, or would have to devise laws that are 
tailored to or responsive to information norms varying across a vast 
multitude of social situations. For example, let’s say that an individual 
                                                     
67. NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 2–3 (2010). 
68. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 56 (2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_ 
privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; Alexis C. Madrigal, The Philosopher Whose Fingerprints Are All 
Over the FTC’s New Approach to Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/the-philosopher-whose-fingerprints-are-all-
over-the-ftcs-new-approach-to-privacy/254365/. 
69. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
165–66 (2002). See generally Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 643 (2013). 
70. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 19. 
71. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining 
“peeping Tom” as one “who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places . . . for the 
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and the doing of any other 
acts of a similar nature which invade the privacy of such persons”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652B (1977). 
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has his picture taken while walking into a pet store on a relatively quiet 
street. Does it violate contextual integrity for that information to be sent 
to PETA? To his mother? To an advertiser for pet goods? It is hard to 
determine at what point the reuse or distribution of a piece of 
information becomes problematic, and with respect to whom. 
Joel Reidenberg recently revisited this problem of privacy in public, 
arguing for a theoretical shift from a binary conception of privacy to 
demarcation along “governance-related” and “non-governance related” 
lines.
72
 Observing how ill-equipped the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” approach is for dealing with problems of the information age, 
Reidenberg proposes what he deems a variation on Nissenbaum’s 
theory.
73
 He suggests that courts should apply a “public significance 
filter” to determine whether information is private or not; if it is about 
governance, it is not private, and if it is not about governance, it is 
private.
74
 Reidenberg explains that this filter will preserve journalistic 
uses of important information and thus poses no First Amendment 
concerns.
75
 
Distinctions between private and newsworthy information, or 
information of “public concern,” abound in privacy law.76 Reidenberg’s 
suggested filter thus has the benefit of resonating with both recent 
historical examples and some case law. However, it fails to provide a 
workable theory of privacy for prohibitions on information gathering for 
three reasons. First, like Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, the 
private-unless-newsworthy framework does not reflect how legislators 
have actually been drafting surveillance laws. Most surveillance laws 
protect as private a segment of information narrower than all-
information-that-is-not-newsworthy. Second, the idea of protecting 
information as private unless it has a nexus with governance has been 
rejected by a number of courts concerned with restricting newsgathering, 
or freedom of expression more generally.
77
 And third, it is often difficult 
to distinguish between high-value, newsworthy information and private 
information.
78
 To be fair, the Supreme Court has occasionally hinted that 
                                                     
72. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014). 
73. Id. at 155. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. at 158.  
76. For example, there is a newsworthiness exception to the tort of public disclosure of private 
fact. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669–70 (Ct. App. 1984); Shulman 
v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998). 
77. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953). 
78. See Bambauer, supra note 4, at 97–100 (discussing the importance of types of information 
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distinctions between newsworthy and private information may matter,
79
 
but the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in general is wary of 
distinctions between high and low value speech.
80
 Requiring courts to 
assess just how newsworthy information is leads into an age-old conflict 
between privacy and the First Amendment—and it is not clear that 
surveillance laws need embody that conflict, or at least be placed so 
squarely in its crosshairs. 
C. The Need for a New Approach 
We need a new way to understand the government interest in 
surveillance laws, but that approach need not throw out everything 
useful about older frameworks. While the privacy binary is unworkable 
when it comes to discussing privacy in public, the understanding of 
privacy as seclusion or withdrawal has the benefit of resonating with 
fundamental intuitions, derived from social experience. The home is 
special from a privacy perspective; other private spaces can be special, 
too. Using withdrawal tactics, whether by hiding behind walls or 
keeping information within a close circle of friends, indicates that an 
individual believes information is more private.
81
 Useful and 
longstanding intuitions about privacy should not be abandoned simply 
because they have given rise to reductionist understandings of when 
information is private. Rather than departing from the strength of the 
seclusion model, we should ask how seclusion relates to attempts to 
protect privacy in non-secluded spaces. Identifying what was valuable in 
past privacy intuitions is particularly important as boundaries between 
home and not-home, and the physical and online world, become fuzzier 
and more fluid in light of technological and social change. 
Private surveillance laws are similar to each other, not solely because 
they focus on the moment at which information is collected. They 
operationalize the same government interest, albeit of different degrees 
of strength. This Article argues that the government interest in private 
                                                     
beyond newsworthy information). 
79. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001). 
80. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of 
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people 
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”). Contra Shulman, 955 
P.2d at 479 (“We therefore agree with defendants that under California common law the 
dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is not actionable as a publication of private facts.”). 
81. For a discussion of such withdrawal tactics in the digital space, see Hartzog & Stutzman, 
supra note 1, at 14. 
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surveillance laws is an interest in enabling individuals to engage in 
boundary management at the moment or moments information gathering 
occurs. Thus, the government has an interest not just in preventing the 
reuse or distribution of data; it has an interest in limiting and sometimes 
preventing data collection. 
III. PRIVACY AS BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
Laws that prohibit private surveillance protect the government’s 
interest in enabling individuals to engage in boundary management in 
physical space, including by using the physical features of that space. 
These laws are sensitive to the contexts created in and using the physical 
environment. The state interest in enabling boundary management exists 
in both private and public spaces. The similarity between these laws 
shows that legislators do understand privacy as existing on a continuum, 
not a binary: The government interest in protecting individuals in public 
is the same kind of interest invoked in protecting privacy in private 
spaces. 
These laws do not identify a particular type of information as private 
information. Instead, they enable individuals to negotiate relationships 
with other people—including strangers—by relying on known features 
of their environment. Sometimes a law enables effective relationship 
navigation by requiring notice of surveillance, which enables an 
individual to adapt her behavior (at least in theory, since in practice 
behavior often cannot be adapted due to economic or social necessity). 
Sometimes a law enables boundary management by preserving an 
environment or context as free from recording. These laws thus can 
appear at first glance conservative—some, after all, are aimed at keeping 
things the way they were before the introduction of new surveillance 
technology. But the government interest is not just in abstract 
conservation: It is in preventing concrete shifts in behavior resulting 
from changes to the environment. 
The framing of privacy as boundary management has been addressed 
elsewhere in the legal literature, but it has not been applied where it 
naturally fits: to identify the government interest in surveillance laws 
governing interactions between private actors in physical, rather than 
online, space. Boundary management has been referenced in the legal 
literature in the online context,
82
 and to provide a general definition of 
                                                     
82. Paul Dourish & Leysia Palen, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CHI 2003 HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS CONFERENCE 
129 (2003); Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 1. 
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privacy.
83
 It has not been applied at any length, however, to existing 
real-world surveillance laws. 
A. The Boundary Management Framework 
Boundary management is a concept developed by social psychologist 
Irwin Altman in the 1970s.
84
 Altman worked in the field of environment 
and behavior studies (now known as environment-behavior studies), 
which considers the connection between environmental design and 
psychological development. Altman’s conceptualization of privacy 
emerged from studies of crowding, personal space, territoriality, and 
other human behavior that uses or responds to features of the physical 
environment in the regulation of social relationships.
85
 
Altman observed that people interact with others within their 
environment as part of an optimizing process.
86
 People attempt to 
maintain “an optimal degree of desired access of the self to others at any 
moment in time.”87 This optimizing process is what Altman terms 
privacy. It is not static nor binary, but dynamic and dialectic.
88
 Altman’s 
idea of privacy is the dynamic regulation of exposure along a “range of 
openness-closedness of the person or group,” shifting over time and 
circumstances.
89
 In other words, people dynamically navigate actions 
and interactions with an ideal of disclosure to others in mind. 
Boundary management can be a useful framework for discussing 
information privacy.
90
 However, Altman’s observations are particularly 
helpful for understanding privacy governance in the physical world. The 
                                                     
83. Julie Cohen employs Altman’s theory as the foundation of her definition of privacy. See Julie 
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1927 (2013) [hereinafter Cohen, What 
Privacy Is For] (“[P]rivacy in the dynamic sense is ‘an interest in breathing room to engage in 
socially situated processes of boundary management.’” (quoting the definition developed in her 
book, JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–20, 107–26, 149 (2012) [hereinafter COHEN, CONFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF])). 
84. See generally ALTMAN, supra note 6. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 11. 
87. Id. 
88. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 1 (describing Altman’s “model of privacy as a dynamic, 
dialectic process”). 
89. Nathan Witte, Privacy: Architecture in Support of Privacy Regulation (May 16, 2003), 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ucin1053701814&disposition=inline. 
90. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 83, at 149; Dourish & Palen, supra 
note 82; Woodrow Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 
769 (2012), available at http://fredstutzman.com/papers/CSCW2012_Stutzman.pdf. 
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concept of boundary management stems from observations about how 
people interact in—and use features of—physical space. Because of its 
connection to the physical environment, Altman’s theory best explains 
the government’s interest in a variety of laws governing information 
capture in the physical world.
91
 
According to Altman, people use a wide variety of strategies and 
mechanisms to achieve the optimal degree of access at a given moment. 
These strategies or mechanisms include verbal behavior, paraverbal 
behavior (such as tone of voice), nonverbal behavior (such as 
movements), personal space, territory (including the use of objects in a 
particular locale), and cultural mechanisms.
92
 Boundary management 
mechanisms include the use of environmental artifacts like doors and 
walls. If you want to be secluded, you hide behind a wall. If you want to 
be open to one person, but not to everyone else, you have your 
conversation with that one person very quietly, or within closed walls 
that exclude everybody else. But boundary management mechanisms 
also include decisions about the duration of the interaction (time), the 
depth of the interaction (how much you say), the truthfulness of the 
interaction (whether you lie), and the use of nonverbal cues (refusing to 
make eye contact) or cultural tropes (using an expression or making a 
joke) to indicate withdrawal or engagement. All of these mechanisms are 
used to regulate how much of the self is accessible to other people in a 
given interaction. 
Removing physical boundaries does not make people abstain from 
boundary management. Instead, removing physical boundaries often 
results in people changing their use of behavioral mechanisms. If you 
take away a wall, people may employ other forms of cover or 
withdrawal, such as wearing more clothing,
93
 saying less, or engaging in 
culturally taught mechanisms of withdrawal. Taking away one 
mechanism (the wall) can cause an individual to use another (lying). 
Altman observed this relationship between boundary management 
mechanisms across cultures. People across different cultures still try to 
optimize their social accessibility, but “what differs among cultures is 
the particular configuration of mechanisms the people use.”94 Thus even 
                                                     
91. It can also explain how people behave in networked or digital spaces, but there the 
mechanisms are often metaphors, and genres of boundary management are arguably less well-
established. 
92. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
93. Id. at 36–37 (people use clothing to “tell the world who they are, to help define situations, and 
to reflect their status roles. . . . People also use clothing to signal their approachability”). 
94. Irwin Altman, A Personal Perspective on the Environment and Behavior Field, in VISIONS OF 
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cultures that at first glance appear not to value privacy in the binary 
sense of full withdrawal will use other “behavioral mechanisms for 
managing the social accessibility of people to one another.”95 Individuals 
in a culture that does not generally prioritize private rooms may instead 
navigate boundary management by being more socially withdrawn at 
home. 
A crucial feature of boundary management is that it takes place across 
the dimension of time. Regulating the accessibility of the self to others is 
not a one-time decision. It entails calculations concerning duration, 
repetition, and frequency of exposure. It also often entails relying on the 
ephemeral nature of interactions, and the imperfection of human 
memory.
96
 
Effective boundary management depends not only on observed 
features of humans in general, but on knowledge of one’s relationship 
with a particular person. People tend to increase self-disclosure where a 
person reciprocates, unless they expect nonreciprocal behavior because 
that person fills a particular social role (e.g., of teacher, priest, 
therapist).
97
 Self-disclosure tends to be at its highest early on in a 
relationship.
98
 People also tend to increase self-disclosure when they 
trust somebody not to reveal that information to a third party. Respect of 
the “dyadic boundary”—“the boundary within which it is safe to 
disclose to the invited recipient and across which the self-disclosure will 
not pass”—may increase disclosure.99 Thus, perceptions of the person to 
whom one is disclosing information—their trustworthiness or social 
role—can affect the extent of a person’s optimal level of openness 
towards that person. 
Boundary management is highly dependent on context, but this does 
not mean that people always take the time to figure out the precise 
nature of the context of an interaction. People use shortcuts. They often 
resort to familiar patterns of behavior, based on learned assumptions 
about their environment. Scholars have called these patterns “genres of 
                                                     
AESTHETICS, THE ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 118 (Roger M. Downs et al. eds., 1991); see 
also ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12–17. 
95. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
96. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 2 (noting that “the recordability and subsequent 
persistence of information, especially that which was once ephemeral, means that audiences can 
exist not only in the present, but in the future as well”). 
97. VALERIAN J. DERLEGA & ALAN L. CHAIKIN, SHARING INTIMACY: WHAT WE REVEAL TO 
OTHERS AND WHY 108 (1975). 
98. Valerian Derlega & Alan Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships, 33 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 102, 102–15 (1977). 
99. Id. at 104. 
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disclosure.”100 Genres in this context are the “regularly reproduced 
arrangements of people, technology and practice that yield identifiable 
and socially meaningful styles of interaction.”101 People learn to resort to 
a particular genre of disclosure, depending on past practice and on cues 
given by their environment. A person might act a particular way in the 
classroom, another way on a public street, and yet another way in a 
public but secluded park. That person might use social and physical cues 
to resort to a park genre of behavior, a school genre of behavior, and so 
forth. 
Genres of disclosure evolve as technology and social practices 
change.
102
 For example, where once people might have assumed that an 
action in the London streets would not be recorded, now they may be 
aware of the prevalence of CCTV cameras, and act accordingly. Instead 
of acting within the old genre of public street behavior that was 
appropriate when there were no cameras, they may now act as though 
other people are watching. There can be a significant government 
interest in either preserving certain genres of disclosure, or in alerting 
people so that they do not inaccurately rely on a past genre once 
circumstances have changed. 
B. The Government’s Interest in Boundary Management 
Altman’s theory of privacy as boundary management is a strong 
foundation for understanding the government interest or interests behind 
private surveillance laws. This section builds on Altman’s theory of 
privacy as boundary management to identify the government’s interest 
in enacting surveillance laws. The government interest implicated by 
framing privacy as boundary management is twofold. First, the 
government may have an interest in preventing people from 
miscalculating their boundaries. Second, the government may have an 
interest in preserving a particular genre of boundary management—not 
out of nostalgia or fear of technological change, but because of the 
problems that might occur if one forces people to shift boundary 
management tactics. 
                                                     
100. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 5. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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1. Allowing an Individual to Calculate Her Desired Degree of 
Disclosure 
The government has an interest in preventing people from 
miscalculating their degree of disclosure. This interest is implicated 
when a person has a desired degree of openness to the world, but 
miscalculates her use of management mechanisms based on settled 
expectations about her environment. For example, a person might do a 
silly dance in her office every morning before sitting down to answer 
emails, relying on boundary management mechanisms such as walls and 
having an office on the fourth floor to prevent other people from seeing 
her. But if a drone is able to capture that silly dance through the fourth 
story window, then the person may want to change her calculation of 
socially optimal behavior based on new understandings of her 
environment. 
As our environments change around us, due to developments in both 
technology and social practice, the government may have a strong 
interest in alerting us to those changes by requiring notice. Requiring 
notice allows the surveillance subject to recalculate her mechanisms for 
maintaining an optimized balance of openness and closedness in a given 
environment. Notice and consent are thus an important aspect of many 
information capture statutes. Notice can also trigger social enforcement 
through shaming of the person conducting surveillance. An unobserved 
observer may be less subject to the pull of social norms, but an 
announced observer can be subjected to shaming. 
2. Preventing Undesirable Behavioral Changes 
The government can also have an interest in preserving a particular 
genre of boundary management. Recall that people often resort to 
shortcuts based on past experiences, triggered by environmental cues. 
When shortcuts invoke site-specific or person-specific patterns, they can 
be described as genres of boundary management (e.g., behaving 
different ways in public, at the mall, in church, in one’s home, at one’s 
office).
103
 The government can have an interest in preserving a genre of 
behavior, not because the genre itself is particularly valuable (although it 
can be), but because the alternative could have significant consequences. 
Altman observed that people substitute mechanisms to maintain an ideal 
                                                     
103. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Another 
way to understand Goffman’s masks is as genres of boundary management, directed at different 
audiences and triggered by both environmental cues and the nature of one’s understood audience. 
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level of openness or closedness. If a person lacks a wall, they may 
change their verbal, paraverbal, or nonverbal behavior instead. The silly 
dancer of the earlier example may modify her behavior—that is, stop 
dancing—to maintain the same level of openness-closedness, and there 
may be costs attributable to that behavioral change. Silly dancing might 
be necessary for productivity, or have an expressive value, or form part 
of that person’s definition of herself. For any of these reasons, the 
government may have an interest in preserving a genre of boundary 
management, and preventing the surveillance subject from shifting 
behavior to reach the same level of optimization. 
Take the example of laws prohibiting up-skirt photography, discussed 
more fully in Part V.A.1 below. The government interest in prohibiting 
up-skirt photography in public places is not limited to the protection of a 
particular type of private information (that is, what’s under the skirt), or 
an interest in protecting the dignitary interests of the observed. It is also 
an interest in genre preservation. In pluralistic American society, we 
envision public spaces as a place where people can wear many different 
types of clothing. Permitting surreptitious up-skirt photography likely 
will not cause women to recalibrate their optimal degree of nudity in 
public. More likely, it will cause a shift in the boundary management 
mechanisms deployed, and more women will stop wearing skirts and 
wear more conservative coverings instead. The government has a 
legitimate interest in preventing that behavioral shift, thus preserving a 
pluralistic public space.
104
 
The government interest in preventing an undesirable shift in 
behavior can be particularly important when it comes to speech 
concerns. The government may have an interest in enacting laws to 
guard a trustworthy relationship or conversation. Protection of this sort 
can encourage disclosure within that conversation, and avoid a resulting 
chill in speech.
105
 
The government’s interest in bolstering or reinstating older 
mechanisms for boundary management is thus not based solely on 
nostalgia. The government interest can be articulated as a desire to 
prevent shifts to different kinds of boundary management mechanisms. 
If Altman is correct that in the absence of physical mechanisms, people 
optimize their social accessibility through decisions to speak or not 
                                                     
104. It also can have a legitimate interest in protecting the individual from dignitary harms and an 
inability to self-define through clothing. These are related but not identical to the boundary 
management interest. 
105. DERLEGA & CHAIKIN, supra note 97. 
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speak, to repress, or to more closely follow cultural patterns,
106
 then the 
government may be interested in preventing those kinds of behavioral 
shifts in certain contexts. 
Scholars have observed that law often steps in where new 
technologies disrupt the environment in which behavior takes place. 
Orin Kerr recently noted, for example, that new technologies can disrupt 
the balance of power between individuals and the government by 
lowering costs of surveillance.
107
 Courts adjust Fourth Amendment 
doctrine in light of new technologies to preserve the status quo balance 
of power. Harry Surden has similarly written about the need to recognize 
implicit “structural rights” to privacy: rights that are structurally 
provided by the physical environment and erased by new 
technologies.
108
 An example of a “structural right” would be the 
existence of a physical wall. When technology enables individuals to 
look through a wall, then law can step in to provide a legal barrier where 
formerly there was a structural, environmental barrier. 
But both of these views focus on law as a constraint, whether on law 
enforcement or on private actors. They emphasize the government’s 
interest in replacing physical environmental restrictions with legal ones. 
In Surden’s case, this builds on Lawrence Lessig’s conception of 
governance as including norms, architecture, the market, and the law.
109
 
Where physical architecture changes, the reasoning goes, law might step 
in to achieve the same constraints on behavior. 
Framing privacy as boundary management shifts the focus. Instead of 
asking whether there is a government interest in maintaining a particular 
status quo level of constraints on the observer’s actions, the focus 
instead is on the value of the law to the observed. The government 
interest is not just in technophobically preserving a particular 
environmental balance; it is in enabling observed individuals to rely on 
and use features of their environment in self-developing ways. 
Recharacterizing the government interest in private surveillance laws 
should help courts shift away from examining whether the information at 
issue is adequately private within the private-public binary. Instead, 
courts can understand privacy laws as empowering individuals to modify 
their behavior, or protecting individuals from having to modify their 
behavior at all. It shifts the focus from assessing whether a particular 
                                                     
106. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
107. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 478 (2011). 
108. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 101, 101 (2007).  
109. Id. at 103.  
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piece of information is inherently sensitive to looking to the impact of 
technological changes on individual autonomy and behavior. 
These government interests will not, and should not, always be 
considered adequate. But it is important that courts understand that 
government interests go beyond preserving privacy in secluded spaces, 
or preserving privacy in sensitive information. The interest in protecting 
boundary management is an interest in enabling self-development and 
preventing cultural shifts that will occur if the law does not step in. 
The underlying value of boundary management thus is tied to how 
one conceives of and values the individual self in society. Boundary 
management sits naturally with the liberal idea of the autonomous self, 
which should not be unduly restricted from making choices. But 
boundary management can also sit comfortably with a more complicated 
idea of a non-liberal self.
110
 The non-liberal self is not isolated or stable 
like the liberal self, but is in constant development, influenced by and 
influencing other people and society.
111
 One value of the boundary 
management framework is that it can be used with either conception of 
the self, liberal or not, which lets it both fit within dominant legal and 
political theory, and rest comfortably with criticisms of that theory. 
C. Enabling Boundary Management Protects Important Social 
Values 
Protecting individuals’ ability to boundary-manage can protect 
important social values. Enabling boundary management respects 
individual autonomy. It allows for the formation of valuable 
relationships by enabling trust. It prevents conformity, which is valuable 
for purposes of self-governance.
112
 It allows for the formation of both 
individual and community identities.
113
 It prevents chilling effects, 
power imbalances, vulnerability harms, and relationship harms.
114
 In 
short, the values implicated by protecting or enabling boundary 
management are compelling. Governments may enact these laws from a 
wide variety of philosophical perspectives; and protecting individuals 
from boundary management harms can be understood to serve a wide 
                                                     
110. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 83, at 1905 (“[T]he liberal self who is the subject of 
privacy theory and privacy policymaking does not exist . . . . [T]he self who is the real subject of 
privacy law and policy is socially constructed . . . .”). 
111. Id. at 1906. 
112. Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 59. 
113. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 957–59 (1989). 
114. SOLOVE, supra note 26, at 174–79 (listing these harms and more). 
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variety of values. 
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
The most significant criticism of boundary management is that it can 
evince a bias against technological change. When legislators enact laws 
to preserve particular genres of boundary management, this argument 
goes, they are refusing to let society evolve. It can be hard to distinguish 
between Luddites who unreasonably and vaguely fear new technologies, 
and people who want to protect genuine privacy interests. As 
Nissenbaum has noted, “critics may argue that it is simply a matter of 
time before people will become accustomed to the new order brought 
about by information technology and readily accept the new privacy 
conventions of public surveillance.”115 
The boundary management framework is explicitly not, however, 
about preserving the status quo for preservation’s sake. It requires 
legislators to consider why they want to preserve a particular genre of 
boundary management around certain information or in a particular 
location or against a particular technology. It focuses on real concerns 
that individuals will shift their behavior in the absence of legal 
intervention. It may be that some behavioral shifts are not worth 
preventing. But it is abundantly clear that behavioral shifts do occur as a 
result of surveillance, and that some carry real harms to a pluralistic 
democratic society.
116
 A legislature can have a legitimate interest in 
preventing those shifts. 
Requiring notice can be a less restrictive way to address boundary 
management interests rather than prohibiting recording entirely. 
Prohibiting surreptitious recording effectively requires notice by making 
surveillance legal only when the recorder notifies her subject. 
Surveillance laws built on a boundary management framework are in 
fact less conservative than banning surveillance involving, say, a 
particular type of information. Boundary management laws shift the 
cultural decision about a desirable level of privacy from the legislature 
to the individual who is being observed. The laws centering on notice let 
individuals calibrate an ideal level of disclosure, rather than relying on 
the legislature to identify a “sensitive” category of information. Such 
laws allow for more flexibility for normative change over time. 
A different line of criticism stems from the healthy skepticism privacy 
scholars have for reliance on self-management in the privacy context. 
                                                     
115. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 583. 
116. See, e.g., Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 59. 
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Giving notice and control to individuals often does not work because of 
market failures, individuals’ misplaced optimism, and inherent 
misunderstandings about big data.
117
 However, prohibitions on 
surveillance need not take the place of data privacy regimes aimed at 
protecting even those individuals who have failed to accurately calibrate 
their privacy preferences at the moment information is gathered. The 
two types of laws—surveillance laws and data regulation—are 
complimentary, not substitutes. 
V. BENEFITS OF THE BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
The government’s interest in preventing private surveillance is an 
interest in enabling or preserving boundary management by the 
individual being observed. This understanding of the privacy interest at 
stake has four benefits: First, it descriptively maps onto existing 
surveillance laws. Second, it allows courts to more clearly articulate the 
government interest at stake in these laws, instead of just referring 
vaguely to privacy. Third, it shows that private surveillance laws can 
protect First Amendment interests, rather than just be in conflict with 
them. Boundary management suggests that people disclose more when 
they trust that information will not travel; and in fact, several courts 
appear to understand this. Fourth, the boundary management framework 
will enable legislators to more thoughtfully enact new surveillance laws, 
governing new technologies. 
A. Descriptive Accuracy 
The boundary management framework is descriptively accurate: 
Legislators have in fact enacted a range of laws that enable individuals 
to dynamically manage their desired degree of disclosure by using or 
relying on features of their environments. 
The oldest examples of these laws are relatively well-known and 
perhaps the most intuitive. They address the breach of physical barriers 
                                                     
117. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV 743; Daniel J. Solove, 
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 
(2013) (“Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent. It attempts to be neutral about 
substance . . . and instead focuses on whether people consent to various privacy practices. Consent 
legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. Although privacy self-
management is certainly a laudable and necessary component of any regulatory regime, I contend 
that it is being tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.”). 
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such as walls, either through physical trespass or by looking or listening 
through an aperture such as a window. These laws could be overlooked 
as irrelevant to conversations about privacy in public, because 
functionally they protect private spaces. That would be a mistake. These 
laws do not merely protect a particular location; they bolster physical 
barriers with legal barriers, so that individuals can rely on walls to 
prevent disclosure. This is the same function that other surveillance laws 
serve, just in different contexts and spaces, and with other boundary-
management mechanisms. 
A second type of boundary management law addresses technologies 
that use sense-enhancement or an unusual perspective to create, not 
physical, but constructive holes in the wall.
118
 Instead of focusing on a 
physical barrier, these laws target technologies that alter the object of 
surveillance’s degree of expected disclosure without providing notice. 
These are also boundary management laws. They provide legal 
protection to ensure that a person accurately calculates her degree of 
disclosure in light of the presence of technologies that unexpectedly 
widen the potential audience for her behavior. 
A third type of surveillance law also addresses the use of technology 
instead of the physical breach of physical walls. But instead of focusing 
on the use of technology to enter into a private sphere unnoticed or from 
afar, these laws focus on the use of technology to alter the ephemerality 
of interactions. These laws target recording. Laws that target recording 
are a type of boundary management law, because ephemerality is a 
feature of the environment that individuals rely on when calculating their 
ideal degree of disclosure. Impermanence over time is, in other words, a 
barrier people rely on in social interactions in the real world. When 
recording technologies make interactions more permanent, an 
individual’s calculation of optimal disclosure within an interaction and 
over time will change. 
1. Private Spaces and Physical Barriers 
Earlier privacy laws address the breach of physical barriers through 
physical or sensory entrance into a physical space. These laws preserve a 
person’s ability to rely on walls or clothing as barriers against unwanted 
                                                     
118. I draw on California’s paparazzi law in distinguishing between physical and constructive 
invasions of privacy. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant knowingly enters 
onto the land of another person without permission . . . . A person is liable for constructive invasion 
of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture [recordings or images] . . . through the use of any 
device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass . . . .”). 
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observers. They prevent nosy intruders from taking advantage of 
unobserved apertures, such as windows. 
One of the earliest boundary management laws, eavesdropping, was a 
nuisance at common law. William Blackstone defined eavesdropping as 
a combination of information gathering and dissemination.
119
 To 
eavesdrop, as Blackstone defined it, was to “listen under walls or 
windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and 
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.”120 The 
information-gathering portion of the eavesdropping offense clearly goes 
to boundary management. Banning listening in through walls, windows, 
or eaves provides legal reinforcement to the physical barriers of a house. 
The law stepped in to supplement physical boundaries, and to enable 
people within the home to trust that their walls, windows, and eaves 
effectively bordered a safe space for disclosure. The offense of 
eavesdropping is thus, at its heart, about boundary management, and 
goes to preserving the genre of actions and interactions in the home. 
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, like eavesdropping, often 
governs boundary management in a physical space. The tort entails an 
intentional intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
121
 
Although intrusion upon seclusion does not identify particular 
boundaries or particular technological means of transgressing them, the 
tort centers on the law stepping in to reinforce a physical or normative 
boundary that has been transgressed. 
Intrusion upon seclusion does not necessarily govern a specific space, 
barrier, or technology. In practice, however, courts have often limited 
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to protecting a private space—a 
space where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or seclusion. 
Many courts afford no liability, for example, for image capture on a 
public street.
122
 However, the Restatement definition of the tort notes 
that there are some matters, even in public, that have not been submitted 
to the public gaze and therefore may be private.
123
 
Peeping Tom laws demonstrate a narrower form of boundary 
management governance. In Peeping Tom laws, the state legislature, 
                                                     
119. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169. 
120. Id. 
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
122. Id. at cmt. c (explaining that liability arises only when individuals violate private space or 
private seclusion). 
123. Id. (“Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as 
his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze, and there may still be invasion 
of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”). 
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rather than courts, identifies the boundary that cannot be transgressed. 
This makes the laws more specific and less flexible. A number of 
Peeping Tom laws define the offense as peering through windows, 
doors, or other apertures.
124
 Commenters explain that these statutes can 
be of limited practical value because they require catching the Peeping 
Tom spying at the aperture.
125
 Several states require trespass in addition 
to the act of peeping, further limiting the scope of the laws.
126
 
A third category of peeping laws defines the offense not by the 
aperture through which the offender looks, but by the secrecy of the 
spying.
127
 Banning surreptitious peeping promises notice to the subject 
of when he is being watched; if the subject has no notice, then the 
peeping is banned. This approach envisions that the subject of 
surveillance may change boundary management mechanisms even 
within the sacred space of the home. For example, if a person has notice 
that his neighbors regularly and obviously look in his downstairs 
                                                     
124. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining 
“peeping Tom” as one “who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places . . . for the 
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and the doing of any other 
acts of a similar nature which invade the privacy of such persons”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 
(2014) (defining a Peeping Tom as “one who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places, 
situated on or about the premises of another for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy 
of persons spied upon without the consent of the persons spied upon”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-130 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (penalizing a person for peeping when he “secretly or 
furtively peep[s], sp[ies] or attempt[s] to peep or spy into or through a window, door or other 
aperture”). 
125. Lance E. Rothenberg, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of 
the Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1127, 1140–43 (2011); Antonietta Vitale, Note, Video Voyeurism and the Right to Privacy: 
The Time for Federal Legislation Is Now, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 381, 389–90 (2002) 
(“Unfortunately, peeping statutes are few and far between and provide relief only for those few 
victims that actually catch Peeping Toms at their windows.”). 
126. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1504 (2015) (defining “criminal trespass” as the illegal 
entering of a residential structure or yard, and the looking into a residence with “reckless disregard 
of infringing on the inhabitant’s right of privacy”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 820 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015) (defining “trespassing with intent to peer or peep” as when a person “knowingly 
enters upon the occupied property or premises of another utilized as a dwelling, with intent to peer 
or peep into the window or door of such property or premises and who . . . otherwise acts in a 
manner commonly referred to as ‘Peeping Tom’”; and defining a Peeping Tom as a trespasser who 
“knowingly enters upon the occupied property or premises of another . . . with intent to peer or peep 
into the window or door of such property or premises”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-3 (2015) 
(defining “window peeking” as the entry onto private property to peep “in the door or window of 
any inhabited building or structure located thereon”); Rothenberg, supra note 125. 
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining 
“peeping” as looking secretly into a room occupied by another person); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1171 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (defining a Peeping Tom as a “person who 
hides, waits or otherwise loiters in the vicinity of any . . . place of residence . . . with the unlawful 
and willful intent to watch, gaze, or look upon any person in a clandestine manner”). 
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windows, he may choose to always come downstairs fully dressed. The 
notice-based law will not penalize his neighbors. 
Voyeurism laws build on Peeping Tom laws. They penalize the 
viewing, photographing, or videotaping of another without consent.
128
 
Many state statutes limit the voyeurism offense to a particular sensitive 
subject matter: photographs of nudity, or of specific body parts.
129
 Many 
states additionally limit the scope of the offense to surveillance 
conducted in physical locations where the subject can show a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
130
 Some states, as with intrusion or Peeping Tom 
laws, require trespass or surreptitious invasion.
131
 A number of states 
require lascivious or sexual intent.
132
 
These voyeurism offenses reinforce several kinds of boundary 
management. Like the intrusion tort and Peeping Tom statutes, they 
enforce boundary management that involves concealing oneself behind 
walls or in private locations or in privately-owned locations. In addition, 
they enforce notice and consent for such acts of observation or 
photography. 
But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it became apparent that privacy 
laws did not cover a new category of voyeurism offenses: the taking of 
“up-skirt” photographs or their equivalent in public spaces.133 Many 
                                                     
128. Vitale, supra note 125, at 394–95. 
129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.123(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(“A person commits the crime of indecent viewing or photography if, in the state, the person 
knowingly views, or produces a picture of, the private exposure of the genitals, anus, or female 
breast of another person and the view or production is without . . . knowledge or consent.”); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 565.253(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Veto Sess.) (“A person commits the crime 
of invasion of privacy if . . . [he] knowingly views, photographs or films another person, without 
that person’s knowledge and consent, while the person being viewed, photographed or filmed is in a 
state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where one would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”). 
130. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (A person 
commits the offense of invasion of privacy if he knowingly “[v]iews, photographs, videotapes, 
electronically depicts, films, or otherwise records another person without that person’s knowledge 
and consent while that person is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where the person 
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08(A)–(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (making it illegal 
to “commit trespass or otherwise surreptitiously invade the privacy of another” “for the purpose of 
sexually arousing or gratifying the person’s self”). 
132. See, e.g., id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(2) (2014) (“A person commits the crime of 
voyeurism if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person, he or she 
knowingly views, photographs, or films another person, without that person’s knowledge and 
consent, while the person being viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place where he or she 
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
133. See Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and Public 
Privacy, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2010) (observing that “courts cling to conventional thinking 
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voyeurism statutes require the subject to be nude, and to be located in a 
private location.
134
 The taking of photographs of a clothed subject in 
public spaces is not covered by these definitions. 
So instead of focusing on the boundary management mechanism of 
walls, several states shifted to enforcing the boundary management 
mechanism of clothing. Illinois made it unlawful to videotape a person 
under or through clothing for the purpose of viewing the body or 
undergarments.
135
 Ohio did the same a year later, penalizing 
surreptitious recording.
136
 California also clarified that the offense 
covered recording under or through clothing, but limited it to 
“circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”137 
Interestingly, these more recent voyeurism statutes show that courts 
and legislators can and will recognize some kinds of expectations of 
privacy even in a public space.
138
 The federal Video Voyeurism 
Prevention Act of 2004 defines a reasonable expectation of privacy as a 
person’s belief that a private area of the body will not be visible to the 
public, “regardless of whether that person is in a public or private 
place.”139 
Clothing usually functions as an effective boundary management 
                                                     
that invasions of privacy cannot occur in the public sphere. New and problematic forms of street 
photography necessitate a reexamination of photographic invasions of privacy”). 
134. See, e.g., id. at 1144–45 (discussing State v. Glas, 147 Wash. 2d 410, 421–22, 54 P.3d 147, 
154 (2002), a case in which the court read Washington’s voyeurism statute not to include intrusions 
made in public); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015) 
(penalizing recording “while that person is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where 
that person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
135. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-4(a-10) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“It is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person 
under or through the clothing worn by that other person for the purpose of viewing the body of or 
the undergarments worn by that other person without that person’s consent.”). 
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (“No person shall 
secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, or otherwise record another person under or 
through the clothing being worn by that other person for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the 
undergarments worn by, that other person.”). 
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“Any person who 
uses a concealed camcorder . . . to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic 
means, another, identifiable person under or through the clothing being worn by that other person, 
for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person, without the 
consent or knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of that other person, under 
circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy [will have violated 
this statute].”). 
138. See Kaminski, supra note 58, at 70. 
139. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5)(B) (2012). 
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mechanism when an individual is in public. The rise of low-cost, 
smaller, and less obtrusive recording devices that can be hidden in new 
vantage points means that in practice clothing has become a less 
effective boundary management tool. But to preserve the efficacy of 
clothing, and prevent individuals from having to resort to changed 
behavior, legislators stepped in. Voyeurism laws allow individuals to 
continue to rely on clothing as an effective means of preventing 
unwanted disclosure. These laws protect individuals (usually women) 
from dignitary harms, unwanted harassment, and impingement on self-
expression; but they do so through enabling individuals to continue to 
rely on their clothes. 
Interestingly, in Japan, technology companies volunteered a different 
solution to the voyeurism problem. In response to an uptick in up-skirt 
photography in Japan, cellular phone manufacturers agreed to make 
cellphone cameras play a shutter sound that could not be disabled by 
muting the phone.
140
 In other words, they chose to provide notice, 
presumably to use social norms to restrict illicit photography and 
videography. This notice was not required by law, but was volunteered 
and coordinated between phone companies.
141
 However, photographers 
bypassed this technological fix by downloading a “silent photo” 
smartphone application that removed the shutter sound, making it easier 
to take surreptitious pictures.
142
 The limitations of technological 
solutions led to a discussion of legal solutions instead.
143
 
Intrusion upon seclusion laws, Peeping Tom laws, and video 
voyeurism laws are inherently limited in scope. Because courts have 
largely limited the application of the intrusion tort to private spaces, state 
legislators have no guarantees that the tort will cover offenses that occur 
in public or those that are assisted by new technologies.
144
 Peeping Tom 
                                                     
140. Akky Akimoto, Google Glass May Shatter Japan’s ‘Manner’ Mode, JAPAN TIMES (May 15, 
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2013/05/15/digital/google-glass-may-shatter-japans-
manner-mode/#.VYDdSkbJJ—. (“[A]ll cellphones with built-in cameras shipped with a shutter 
sound that played when a photo was taken—and it could not be disabled. This was not something 
that was required by law, but it was taken up voluntarily by all Japanese cellphone vendors. These 
self-regulations have never been made publicly available, but NTT Docomo told The Japan Times 
that they implemented it to ‘prevent secret filming or other privacy issues.’”).  
141. Id. 
142. Masaki Karaya, Rise in Sleazy Voyeurism Blamed on ‘Silent Photo’ Smartphone App, THE 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Feb. 7, 2013), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/ 
AJ201302070001. 
143. Id. 
144. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). But see, in the Fourth Amendment context, Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Intrusion upon seclusion might include 
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laws usually have physical limits built into the statute: that the offender 
has committed trespass or was caught at the window. Voyeurism laws 
are often limited to physical spaces, particularly sensitive subject matter, 
lascivious intent, or peering through clothing. Thus, this first category of 
boundary management laws can get overlooked as representing a more 
traditional conception of privacy. 
The next two types of surveillance laws approach boundary 
management differently, reaching the ways in which newer technologies 
threaten an individual’s ability to calculate her ideal degree of 
disclosure. 
2. Distance, Vantage Point, and “Sense Enhancement” 
A second type of law steps in when technology closes distances or 
makes it possible to observe someone from new vantage points. 
Distances can be closed through “sense enhancement”: the use of a 
zoom lens, for example, or a microphone. Technology can also enable an 
observer to achieve new vantage points, such as observing an individual 
from overhead or underneath. 
Both the closing of distances and the enabling of new vantage points 
disrupt traditional mechanisms of notice. These kinds of surveillance are 
less visible than physical trespass, or listening in on a conversation while 
remaining visible to the speaker. An individual may not be aware that he 
is being observed or recorded from a distance, through a wall, or from or 
a particular angle, and thus will miscalculate his ideal degree of 
disclosure. 
This second type of law is not entirely distinct from the first type; 
many laws addressing sense-enhancing technologies are still concerned 
with the breach of a barrier surrounding a particular physical space. And 
some laws contain both concerns over the permeability of physical 
barriers and concerns over the closing of distance or adoption of unusual 
vantage points. But if the first type of law was concerned with the actual 
holes in a wall, this second type is concerned with technology that 
enhances human senses to create constructive holes in the wall. 
Technologies like zoom lenses or thermal imaging allow watchers to 
transgress the same boundaries protected in Peeping Tom statutes 
                                                     
video voyeurism, for example, but has largely been ineffectively enforced. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place, however, there may be some 
matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public 
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”). But 
see Rothenberg, supra note 125 (noting that courts hesitate to find a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in public); Vitale, supra note 125. 
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without necessarily falling within the statutes’ purview because a 
watcher does not need to trespass or to look through a window to gain 
access to the private space or private information.
145
 California’s 
paparazzi law provides a fascinating example of legal reinforcement of 
existing boundary management mechanisms that have become less 
effective in the face of new technologies. Until 2014, the California 
paparazzi law targeted the use of telephoto lenses or sense-enhancing 
audio technology to peer into or listen in on a privately-owned space.
146
 
The statute focused on preserving the integrity of a space that has 
traditionally been inaccessible, except by physical trespass, maintaining 
traditional boundary management mechanisms in a private space in the 
face of technological change. In 2014, the statute was amended to cover 
all technology used to peer into an area formerly inaccessible except by 
trespass, even if that technology is not sense-enhancing.
147
 The 
amendment was purportedly passed to address the use of drones, which 
might take new perspectives (from the sky) without needing to employ 
sense-enhancing technologies.
148
 
The intrusion tort has been used to address sense-enhancement 
technologies.
149
 In a case addressing whether a videographer could be 
liable for recording a conversation between a car accident victim and a 
nurse, the California Supreme Court observed that “merely . . . being 
present at a place where he could hear such conversations with unaided 
ears” did not constitute a privacy violation.150 But “placing a microphone 
on [the nurse’s] person, amplifying and recording what she said and 
heard” could violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.151 Using 
amplification to listen in on a conversation prevents the subject of 
surveillance from adjusting her degree of disclosure appropriately 
because it does not provide notice to the subject the way visibly standing 
                                                     
145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(b) (1962) (“It is an affirmative defense . . . [that] the 
premises were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful 
conditions imposed upon access to or remaining in the premises.”). 
146. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2011) (regulating recording where a “physical 
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing 
device was used”). 
147. Assemb. 2306, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/asm/ab_2301-2350/ab_2306_bill_20140930_chaptered.pdf; Cade, supra note 3.  
148. See Melanie Mason, California Assembly Approves Limits on Drones, Paparazzi, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-assembly-floor-bills-
20140129-story.html. 
149. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods. Inc., 995 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
150. Id. at 491. 
151. Id. 
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nearby might. 
Technology can also enable observation from unexpected vantage 
points. The voyeurism laws discussed earlier implicitly contemplate this 
problem.
152
 While the laws do not explicitly target taking photographs or 
video from below a person, “up-skirt” photography is a problem 
precisely because it captures information from an unexpected vantage 
point.
153
 It is far harder to manage one’s expected degree of disclosure 
when the recording device is positioned to capture information from an 
unexpected angle. 
Drones are discussed at greater length later in this Article, but the 
Texas drone statute provides an example of a law addressing both sense 
enhancement and vantage point and is thus worth mentioning here. 
Texas has made it illegal to use a drone “to capture an image of an 
individual or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to 
conduct surveillance on the individual.”154 An image does not fall into 
the statute’s scope, however, if it was taken from a height of below eight 
feet above ground level in a public place, and without using technologies 
that enhance the senses “beyond normal human perception.”155 In other 
words, the statute encompasses only images taken from above eight feet 
high and using zoom or audio-enhancing technology. It targets 
observation from an unusually heightened vantage point, coupled with 
sense-enhancement. The further away the drone is, and the less 
observable it is, and the more able it is to observe a person without being 
seen. The more it is able to observe a person without being seen, the 
stronger the harm to that person’s ability to accurately boundary 
manage. This suggests that if a person can see a drone, they can 
boundary manage accordingly and thus their privacy is not violated. But 
if the drone is further up, a person might not expect to be observed from 
that height, perspective, and zoom, and thus may fail to adequately 
boundary manage. By addressing the height of the drone, and its ability 
to amplify images, the Texas drone statute seeks to enable accurate 
boundary management by individuals. The Texas statute, however, is 
also riddled with exceptions for particular industries discussed at greater 
length below, making it a poor example of legislating, overall.
156
 
                                                     
152. See supra Part V.A.1. 
153. See Zeronda, supra note 4, at 1132–33 (“As its name suggests, up-skirt photography 
involves taking pictures of women up their skirts.”). 
154. H.R. 912, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 423.003 (Tex. 2013). 
155. Id. § 423.002(15).  
156. Id. § 423.002 (listing exceptions). 
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3. Ephemerality 
A third type of surveillance law also addresses the impact of 
technology on the environment in which disclosures are made, but 
instead of addressing the increased permeability of walls, it focuses on 
technology’s impact on expectations about human memory. Instead of 
addressing the visibility of the recording device, this type of law focuses 
on the way in which recording technology eliminates the ephemerality of 
the natural environment. A world without recording devices is more 
ephemeral in nature; people forget interactions, or fail to aggregate them 
and make connections or inferences. 
Eavesdropping laws address recording technologies that change the 
environment in which boundary management decisions get made.
157
  
Some eavesdropping statutes, like the paparazzi statute, focus on the 
management of private physical spaces. But others preserve a different 
                                                     
157. Rothenberg, supra note 125, at 1142 n.67; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13A-11-31(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (describing “[c]riminal eavesdropping” as when a 
person intentionally uses a device to eavesdrop); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a person “intentionally and 
without . . . consent . . . eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-9-304(1)(a)–(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (defining 
“[e]avesdropping” as when a person not present for a conversation “[k]nowingly overhears or 
records such conversation or discussion without the consent . . . [or] for the purpose of committing, 
aiding, or abetting the commission of an unlawful act; or knowingly . . . attempts to use or 
disclose . . . the contents of any such conversation or discussion”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as any attempt “in a 
clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record . . . the private conversation of 
another which shall originate in any private place”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “eavesdropping” as the intentional entry into a private place for 
the purpose of surreptitiously listening to private communications or observing private conduct); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.010 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (describing “eavesdrop” 
as the intentional use of any device to “overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a wire or 
oral communication of others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto”); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 28.807(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “eavesdropping” as the 
intentional trespass onto another’s property or use of any device to “overhear, record, amplify or 
transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in 
the discourse”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2015) (describing “eavesdropping” as the 
unlawful “wiretapping, mechanical overhearing of a conversation, or interception or accessing an 
electronic communication”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.) (defining “felony eavesdropping” as the intentional interception of any communication 
“by use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device,” and “misdemeanor eavesdropping” as the 
secret lingering about a private place with “intent to overhear discourse or conversation therein”); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1202 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (describing 
eavesdropping as “secretly loitering about any building, with intent to overhear discourse therein, 
and to repeat or publish the same to vex, annoy, or injure others”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1 
(2015) (defining “eavesdropping” as a trespass with intent to eavesdrop in a private place, or an 
installation of any device for “observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting 
sounds or events in such place”). 
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kind of assumption about one’s environment: the assumption that one’s 
conversations, even outside of privately owned space, will not have 
staying power. Eavesdropping statutes address boundary management 
that is conducted based on experiences with ephemerality and human 
memory. If every conversation outside of the home may be recorded, 
then people may want to adjust the content, tone, and length of their 
conversations outside of the home to optimize social accessibility and 
disclosure.
158
 
But eavesdropping statutes show that determining the level of 
appropriate state involvement in boundary management outside of the 
home is not simple. Many states require a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the conversation.
159
 This requirement ensures that 
conversations are protected only when the subject is in fact showing that 
she has a reasonable expectation of privacy by trying to employ other 
tools of boundary management. If you shout the conversation from a 
rooftop, chances are many will hear you and some may record you. In 
some states, if the recording device is in plain view, then the subject will 
be deemed to have consented to being recorded, even with no explicit 
consent.
160
 
This makes sense in the framework of boundary management, 
because when the recording device is in plain view, the subject is given 
opportunity to adapt optimization behaviors accordingly. In public 
spaces, the state is not necessarily interested in preventing people from 
adapting their behavior to account for the presence of others. But it is 
interested in enabling people who believe they can rely on older forms of 
boundary management—talking in a lower voice, in a perceivably 
private space, without visible listeners—to have a fair chance to 
boundary manage appropriately, relying on those mechanisms. 
Most states provide that conversations can be legally recorded with 
the consent of only one party.
161
 This ensures that eavesdropping statutes 
do not impose additional boundary management mechanisms where 
there weren’t mechanisms before. Before recording or eavesdropping 
technologies, a speaker in a conversation depended on the relationship 
with the other person to decide how much to reveal. False friends existed 
                                                     
158. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613–
14 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
159. See Potere, supra note 4, at 283–84; Triano, supra note 4. 
160. Potere, supra note 4, at 283. 
161. Id. at 283 n.74. 
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long before cellphone recordings.
162
 Thus many eavesdropping laws do 
not step in to ensure that friends will be more loyal. Those 
eavesdropping laws that require two-party consent and fail to require a 
reasonable expectation of privacy have been found most troubling by 
courts from a First Amendment perspective.
163
 
Location-tracking also raises issues of ephemerality and permanence. 
Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) location-track individuals over 
time by photographing and analyzing license plates appearing on public 
roads. The Wall Street Journal revealed in 2014 that the government has 
been using ALPRs to track millions of individuals in real time.
164
 Law 
enforcement’s use of ALPRs raises questions similar to those raised by 
GPS, which the Supreme Court recently addressed in United States v. 
Jones.
165
 But governing the private use of ALPRs moves into the 
relatively uncharted territory of balancing one entity’s right to record 
against another’s right to privacy. 
Laws governing ALPR systems can be understood as governing 
boundary management. Location-tracking implicates boundary 
management over time and distance. Prior to technologies such as 
ALPRs and GPS, tracking a person over a long period of time was costly 
and involved both focus and effort.
166
 A person could thus rely on 
practical obstacles to prevent location-tracking over time.
167
 When 
legislators decide to step in to govern GPS use or ALPR use, they do so 
to impose legal friction where before practical friction prevented 
tracking. 
At least two states have enacted laws governing the private use of 
ALPRs.
168
 Utah initially enacted a law prohibiting a person from using 
an ALPR system.
169
 The Utah statute defined an ALPR system as “a 
system of one or more mobile or fixed automated high-speed cameras 
used in combination with computer algorithms to convert an image of a 
                                                     
162. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 
(1963). 
163. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (analyzing Illinois’s two-party-consent wiretap law under 
the First Amendment).  
164. Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779. 
165. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
166. See, e.g., id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
167. See generally Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of 
Surveillance: Making Cents out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2014). 
168. S. 0196, 2013 Gen. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2013); S. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2014). 
169. Utah S. 0196. 
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license plate into computer-readable data.”170 
However, shortly after enactment of this law, Utah was sued by 
ALPR companies for violating their First Amendment rights.
171
 In 
reaction, Utah heavily amended the law to allow private entities to 
collect license plate information, sell it to third parties, and hold it for up 
to nine months.
172
 
Arkansas also enacted a license plate reader law.
173
 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the effectiveness of such an action in Utah, 
Arkansas has also been sued for First Amendment violations.
174
 The 
Massachusetts legislature has proposed an ALPR law, but as of January 
2015, the law has been sitting with the Senate.
175
 
B. Determining the Strength of the Legislative Interest 
Framing surveillance laws as protecting boundary management 
allows for at least two types of government interests, as discussed: an 
interest in notifying people in order to enable boundary management, 
and an interest in preventing a shift to other kinds of less desirable 
behaviors. The government interest in notifying people that they are 
being recorded is strong, and nicely tailored to enabling boundary 
management. It may raise interesting questions related to anonymous 
speech—does one have a right to record surreptitiously, where 
announcing that one is recording would prevent the recording from 
occurring?
176
 But the idea that states may require notice of recording 
should be understandable to courts as an interest in enabling boundary 
management in a shifting environment. 
Other surveillance laws instead aim to preserve a genre of boundary 
management and prevent a shift in behavior. Understanding statutes this 
way can allow courts to focus on the strength of the government interest 
in preventing a particular shift, or set of shifts, in behavior, instead of 
                                                     
170. Id.  
171. Complaint, Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Herbert, No. 2:14-cv-00099 (D. Utah Feb. 
13, 2014). 
172. S. 222, 2014 Gen. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2014), available at 
http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/SB0222.html. 
173. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1801–1808 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
174. Complaint, Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Beebe, No. 4:14-cv-00327 (E.D. Ark. May 
30, 2014); License Plate Reader Makers Sue Arkansas for Banning Their Tech, RT QUESTION MORE 
(June 18, 2014, 11:27 PM), http://rt.com/usa/166916-vigilant-drn-arkansas-alpr-lawsuit/. 
175. See S. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2014).  
176. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding First Amendment 
protection for distribution of anonymous petitions). 
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identifying an amorphous notion of privacy. This may raise interesting 
tailoring issues, questioning how narrowly states will have to tailor 
statutes to prevent particular shifts, versus preserving a traditionally 
protectable genre of behavior, such as boundary management in the 
home. 
C. Identifying the First Amendment Interest in Privacy Protection 
Privacy laws can run into First Amendment problems, but they can 
also be essential to First Amendment interests.
177
 The boundary 
management framework demonstrates how this works in practice. As 
previously described, boundary management studies suggest that people 
increase disclosure when they trust that information will not move 
beyond an expected boundary from trusted parties to untrustworthy 
people.
178
 When a trusted boundary instead becomes permeable, people 
may decrease disclosure. This decrease in disclosure can often be 
articulated as a decrease in speech. In other words, if law does not step 
in to reinforce the formerly trusted boundary, people will speak less, or 
less frankly, resorting to lying or omission as boundary management 
tactics. 
Courts are already receptive to this idea of the relationship between 
privacy and free speech. In Bartnicki v. Vopper,
179
 a case about whether 
a radio station could distribute an illegally wiretapped conversation, the 
Supreme Court recognized that there were speech interests on both sides 
of the case.
180
 The majority recognized that if people are unable to trust 
that an intimate conversation is in fact intimate, they may speak less.
181
 
In the earlier Fourth Amendment case of United States v. White,
182
 
both Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas noted in dissents that allowing 
electronic eavesdropping by an undercover agent could have significant 
First Amendment implications. Justice Harlan explained that off-hand 
conversations are usually made to a limited audience, and are easily 
forgotten. People rely on these features of their environment to manage 
how open they are in conversation.
183
 In the absence of legal protection 
                                                     
177. See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Kaminski 
& Witnov, supra note 59.  
178. DERLEGA & CHAIKIN, supra note 97, at 104. 
179. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
180. Id. at 533. 
181. Id. (“[T]he fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling 
effect on private speech.”). 
182. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
183. Id. at 788 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may 
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from permanent recordings, people will regulate the content of their 
conversations and disclose less.
184
 Justice Douglas more directly 
identified this as a First Amendment problem. He focused on loss of 
spontaneity: “Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and 
spontaneous utterances.”185 
Judge Posner, dissenting in a recent Seventh Circuit case on the First 
Amendment right to record, similarly noted that eavesdropping laws 
protect First Amendment values.
186
 Judge Posner noted that people 
would be less likely to disclose useful information to the police if there 
is no law protecting public conversations with police officers from being 
recorded.
187
 Judge Posner has been a vocal critic of privacy.
188
 But he 
seemed very receptive to the idea that electronic eavesdropping laws 
prevent people from resorting to socially undesirable boundary 
management techniques. Posner explained that electronic recording can 
eliminate communicative spontaneity, quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
White: “[W]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and 
communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being 
transmitted and transcribed.”189 And interestingly, Posner understood the 
eavesdropping law as stepping in to preserve a genre of 
communication—off-hand communication in public in the absence of 
recording devices. He cited Justice Harlan for the proposition that poor 
human memory, a limited audience, and the relative anonymity most 
people enjoy in public spaces usually preserve the obscurity of off-hand 
conversations.
190
 Electronic recording disrupts that natural obscurity and 
                                                     
count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited audience, and the 
likelihood that the listener will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s 
inability to reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a documented record.”). 
184. Id. at 787 (“[W]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and communication 
inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed.”). 
185. Id. at 762. 
186. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) 
187. Id. (noting that finding the Illinois eavesdropping statute to violate the First Amendment “is 
likely to impair the ability of police both to extract information relevant to police duties and to 
communicate effectively with persons whom they speak with in the line of duty”). 
188. Ronald K.L. Collins, On Privacy, Free Speech, & Related Matters—Richard Posner vs 
David Cole & Others, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2014/12/on-privacy-free-speech-related-matters-richard-posner-vs-david-cole-others.html. 
189.  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 612. 
190.  Id. (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in White, 401 U.S. at 787–88); see also id. at 613–14 
(“[P]rivate talk in public places is common, indeed ubiquitous, because most people spend a lot of 
their time in public places; because they rely on their anonymity and on the limited memory of 
others to minimize the risk of publication; because public places are (paradoxically) often more 
private than private places (imagine if detectives could meet with their informants only in police 
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causes people to speak and behave in more conservative ways.
191
 Posner 
thus identified that the state’s eavesdropping statute in fact promotes a 
First Amendment interest in conversational privacy, even in public 
spaces.
192
 While the majority did recognize a First Amendment interest 
in conversational privacy, it explained that the statute was drafted too 
broadly to survive First Amendment scrutiny.
193
 
Courts evaluating privacy torts have similarly noted that failure to 
legally reinforce the expected boundaries of conversations could lead to 
more inhibited conversations, with negative social consequences. In 
Dietemann v. Time,
194—a Ninth Circuit case about whether the First 
Amendment protected reporters who recorded their interactions with a 
quack doctor—the court found that surreptitious electronic recording 
violated the plaintiff’s privacy despite the fact that reporters had 
permission to be on the premises.
195
 The court explained that a “different 
rule . . . would surely lead to guarded conversations and conduct where 
candor is most valued, e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.”196 A 
doctor who could be surreptitiously recorded might not be honest with 
her patient; she might boundary manage through discretion or even 
dishonesty, out of fear that the expected boundary external to her patient 
relationship might be breached through recording. The court’s reasoning 
in this is somewhat backwards, since usually it’s the patient’s privacy 
and need for candor that provokes concern. Nonetheless, the Ninth 
Circuit appeared to recognize that legal protection of boundary 
management can encourage freer speech within a protected 
                                                     
stations); and because eavesdropping on strangers is actually rather uncommon because it is so 
difficult in most cases to understand a conversation between strangers.”). 
191. Id. at 613 (citing Lizette Alvarez, Spring Break Gets Tamer as World Watches Online, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 16, 2012, at A10).  
192. Id. (“There is more on the state’s side of this case than privacy of communications and the 
effectiveness of law enforcement—and the more is the same First Amendment interest that the 
ACLU says it wants to promote. The majority opinion concedes that ‘conversational privacy’ 
‘serves First Amendment interests,’ but thinks there can be no conversational privacy when the 
conversation takes place in a public place . . . .”); see also id. at 614 (“[O]n the other side of the 
balance are the inhibiting effect of nonconsensual recording of conversations on the number and 
candor of conversations (and hence on values that the First Amendment protects) . . . .”). 
193. Id. at 608 (“[W]e have acknowledged the importance of conversational privacy and heeded 
the basic distinction drawn in Katz that some conversations in public places implicate privacy and 
others do not . . . . But the Illinois eavesdropping statute obliterates the distinction between private 
and nonprivate by criminalizing all nonconsensual audio recording regardless of whether the 
communication is private in any sense.” (emphasis in original)). 
194. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). 
195. Id. at 249.  
196. Id. 
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conversation. This internalization of First Amendment rights within a 
privacy law could help such laws better withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny. 
D. Guiding the Enactment of New Laws 
Understanding the state’s interest in surveillance laws as an interest in 
boundary management should enable legislators to enact new, 
legitimate, and appropriately tailored laws. If a legislature decides that 
its interest is in enabling people to effectively boundary manage in a 
particular context, then it can devise a statute that focuses on requiring 
notice to the individual. If instead a legislature worries about the 
pernicious effects of behavioral shifts—such as wearing protective 
clothing (up-skirt laws) or having less truthful and open conversations 
(eavesdropping laws)—then it can enact laws that reinforce particular 
genres of boundary management. 
The particular state interest is important because emerging 
technologies will inspire more boundary management laws. Some of the 
issues will be familiar: for example, the governance of location tracking 
over time, or the governance of intrusion into intimate spaces. Other 
issues will be newer: for example, the use of robotic faces to manipulate 
trust. 
This section reviews the recent enactment of drone privacy laws as an 
example of how drafting laws around the boundary management interest 
can make for better laws. Then it discusses the appropriateness of the 
boundary management framework for devising new privacy laws to 
govern robotics. 
1. Drone Laws as an Example 
Recent technological developments have inspired states to enact new 
laws governing information gathering by drones, or unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). Ryan Calo famously referred to drones as “privacy 
catalysts,” predicting that drones would force a public conversation 
about many of the privacy violations scholars have been discussing for 
decades.
197
 And, in fact, multiple states have enacted drone privacy laws, 
both to govern law enforcement use of drones (which is outside of the 
scope of this Article), and to govern private drone use.
198
 
                                                     
197. Calo, supra note 22, at 32.  
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. & Sp. A Sess.); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
167 / 1–40 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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This state-by-state approach allows experimentation with privacy 
legislation, and will allow courts to determine how best to balance 
statutes protecting privacy against the burgeoning First Amendment 
right to record.
199
 Interestingly, many of these state laws governing 
private drone use have been enacted before the FAA officially permitted 
commercial use of drones.
200
 States have been anticipating drone-related 
privacy problems rather than waiting for the technology to be widely 
commercially used. 
State drone statutes vary considerably. Some clearly articulate a 
boundary management interest, while others more clearly reflect 
haphazard lobbying. The closer a state hews to enabling boundary 
management, the better the Legislature is able to justify the law’s 
existence, and the more legitimate the law appears. Drone privacy laws 
thus illustrate how boundary management principles might guide the 
enactment of new privacy laws, and help legislators avoid the pitfalls of 
more haphazard legislation. 
The Texas Legislature passed one of the more clearly haphazard 
drone statutes. At its core, however, the statute can be understood as 
addressing boundary management. Texas was one of the first states to 
enact a statute governing private drone use.
201
 Texas puts a protective 
privacy halo around both private property and persons.
202
 It prohibits the 
use of drones to capture images of individuals or real property with the 
“intent to conduct surveillance.”203 
The Texas Legislature did not stick to protecting boundary 
management. A remarkable number of the many exceptions to the law 
are clearly legislative carve-outs for specific industries, including oil and 
real estate, and interestingly do not include newsgathering or 
journalism.
204
 The haphazard nature of these exceptions could be 
                                                     
199. Kaminski, supra note 58 (encouraging experimentation). 
200. The FAA has authorized some commercial companies to use drones through the Section 333 
process, but otherwise commercial drone use as of this draft is federally banned. Hobbyists may use 
drones within line of sight and under 400 feet. See Civil Operations (Non-Governmental), FED. 
AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/ (last modified Mar. 17, 2015, 10:42 
AM); Model Aircraft Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/ 
(last modified Mar. 4, 2015, 1:17 PM). 
201. See H.R. 912, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
202. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
203. Id. The statute says “intent” has the meaning assigned to it by Section 6.03 of the Penal 
Code. That section defines intent versus negligence versus knowingly, but doesn’t define 
“surveillance.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
204. For example, there are carve-outs for real estate and oil pipeline inspections. TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 423.002(13), (18). 
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deemed content-based or viewpoint-based regulation under First 
Amendment analysis,
205
 and problematically reflects unequal treatment 
due to lobbying. 
The Idaho drone law is broad, and aimed at privacy violations rather 
than solely at trespass.
206
 It prohibits the intentional surveillance by 
drone of “specifically targeted persons or specifically targeted private 
property.”207 The term “surveillance” is not defined in the statute, but 
may be read by courts to indicate a temporal requirement, which would 
implicate boundary management over time. 
The Idaho law again nods at the coextensiveness of physical and 
social boundaries, banning surveillance of an individual or a dwelling 
and its curtilage. A second cause of action bans the use of a drone “to 
photograph or otherwise record an individual . . . for the purpose of 
publishing or otherwise publicly disseminating such photograph or 
recording.”208 Rather than addressing boundary management over time, 
this addresses boundary management in the number of people one 
intends information to flow to. Interestingly, the Idaho drone law 
exempts drones used for mapping and resource management,
209
 
suggesting that incidental recording may not breach privacy interests. 
However, the Idaho law, like the Texas law, reflects obvious 
lobbying. The Legislature singled out farms, ranches, and dairies for 
protection.
210
 The singling out of particular groups for protection, just 
like the singling out of particular groups as exempt from the Texas 
statute’s coverage, could pose content-based regulation problems under 
the First Amendment. 
Tennessee enacted two drone laws in 2014. The first is a hunting law, 
making it a misdemeanor for a person to use a drone “to conduct video 
surveillance of private citizens who are lawfully hunting or fishing.”211 
Illinois has enacted a similar law, protecting hunters.
212
 
The second Tennessee drone law mirrors Texas’s law.213 The 
                                                     
205. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
206. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. & 1st Extraordinary 
Sess.). 
207. Id. § 21-213(2)(a). 
208. Id. § 21-213(2)(b). 
209. Id. § 21-213(1)(b)(ii). 
210. Id. § 21-213(2)(a)(ii). The Idaho statute also exempts model planes “used purely for sport or 
recreational purposes.” Id. § 21-213(1)(b)(i).  
211. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
212. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5 / 48-3(b)(10) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).   
213. S. 1892, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 29, 
39-13). 
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Tennessee drone law makes it a class C misdemeanor to use a drone to 
“capture an image” of an individual or real property with the intent to 
conduct surveillance.
214
 The law also bans knowing use of the image; 
possessing the image; and disclosing, displaying, distributing, or 
otherwise using the image after capturing it.
215
 The law could be 
understood as concerned with contextual integrity, as destruction of the 
image before distribution is a defense.
216
 Like the Texas law, the 
Tennessee drone statute is riddled with exceptions, excepting oil pipeline 
use, well safety, and research use.
217
 The Oregon drone law takes a 
different approach; it hews closely to real property rights.
218
 Rather than 
addressing surveillance per se, it addresses “trespass by a drone.”219 The 
Oregon drone law creates a private right of action for anybody who 
“owns or lawfully occupies real property” against a person conducting 
drone flight over that property.
220
 Initially, drone trespass was limited to 
400 feet above the property, but Oregon has since amended the statute to 
cover any overhead flight.
221
 If one understands this trespass action as 
enforcing a privacy right, then this approach is similar to the California 
anti-paparazzi law, in that it considers low-flying drones to unacceptably 
disrupt boundary management taking place within and around the home. 
The Oregon law thus preserves whatever genre of boundary 
management a person uses on her own property, or property she lawfully 
occupies. Oregon legislators may have adopted the property-based 
approach to avoid potential First Amendment problems raised by the 
right to record, or may truly have considered the trespass-like aspect of 
drone flight more problematic. However, the law fails to address privacy 
violations that occur from drones operated away from an individual’s 
property, with sense-enhancing technologies. 
The Oregon statute includes additional requirements. The drone must 
have been flown over the property on at least one additional occasion, 
and the property owner or occupier must have notified the drone 
operator that she did not wish the drone to be flown again in that 
                                                     
214. Id. § 4(a). 
215. Id. § 5(a)(2)(B) (Class B misdemeanor). 
216. Id. § 4(c). 
217. Id. § 3. 
218. H.R. 2710, § 15, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (codified as amended by H.R. 2354, 78th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), at OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2014)). 
219. Id. at § 15(3). 
220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.380(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
221. H.R. 2354, § 11, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380). 
05 - Kaminski.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:47 PM 
1162 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1113 
 
manner.
222
 Oregon thus requires the potential plaintiff to actively engage 
in social boundary management, by contacting the drone operator, 
before a legal action can be brought. The law is brought in to enforce 
boundary management only after notice is provided to the drone 
operator. 
The Wisconsin drone statute makes it a misdemeanor to use a drone 
to “photograph, record, or otherwise observe another individual in a 
place or location where the individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”223 The statute does not define whether that place is in private 
or in public. Like the tort of intrusion, this leaves many decisions in the 
hands of courts. But by targeting drones as the recording tool, the 
Wisconsin legislature might be nudging courts towards addressing the 
boundary management problems raised by drones: surreptitious 
recording, by a non-party to an interaction, from vantage points not 
formerly achievable by most people, or at least not without great cost. 
2. Robots and the Not-So-Distant Future 
If drones are the privacy problem of today, robots are the problem of 
the not-so-distant tomorrow. Robots in the home raise a slew of 
fascinating boundary management problems.
224
 Robots are technologies 
that sense, process, and act in physical space.
225
 People often rely on 
walls and social boundaries to ensure that the home is particularly 
private. If people permit robots into the home, even for limited tasks, 
then external walls no longer protect them from the broadcasting of a 
large amount of intimate information to third parties. Legislatures and 
courts will have to decide the extent to which permitting household 
robots into intimate spaces where relatively uninhibited behavior occurs 
extinguishes a privacy interest. This is no longer a question of whether 
information gathered in public can be considered private, but whether 
information gathered in private spaces by entities that have permission to 
be there can be considered private.
226
 In other words, it is a question of 
                                                     
222. Id. at § 15(1)(a)–(b). 
223. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.10 (West, Westlaw through 2015). 
224. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2010) (not identifying problem as boundary 
management, but identifying a number of the privacy issues raised by robots: direct surveillance, 
increased access, and social meaning); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What 
Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (forthcoming 2015). 
225. See Calo, supra note 24. 
226. For a longer discussion of these issues of consent versus genre protection, see Kaminski, 
supra note 224. 
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whether courts and legislators will decide to protect the genre of 
boundary management that takes place in the home—or bear the social 
costs that come from shifts in behavior in traditional locations of privacy 
protection. 
Moreover, robots are not static: They will be able to move within 
homes, and transgress boundaries that prevent a static camera from 
peering around a corner. Governments will need to assess whether 
mobility poses a different threat to boundary management than static but 
continuous recording. 
Additionally, as both Kate Darling and Ryan Calo have pointed out, 
to great effect, robots have a social dimension.
227
 Humans innately react 
to faces, and a considerable amount of research is going in to how 
robotic faces, voices, and movements drive human reactions.
228
 A well-
known older study showed that humans read intent and emotion into 
mere motion patterns.
229
 And humans can feel objects to be worthy of 
compassion, based on the object’s design. When a robotics company 
released a video of its robot dog being kicked repeatedly, viewers voiced 
moral concerns with the perceived abuse.
230
 The New York Times ran a 
heartbreaking video about the demise of Aibo robot dogs, showing 
owners holding funerals and mourning their lost pets.
231
 Soldiers have 
expressed feelings of anger and loss at the “death” of bomb-defusing 
robots.
232
 The ability to manipulate human reactions can also have 
troubling reverberations with the enforcement of long-held stereotypes. 
A study showed that people trust artificial speakers with deeper, more 
male-like voices as more authoritative, but would rather reveal intimate 
                                                     
227. Calo, supra note 24, at 119 (on file with author). See generally Darling, supra note 24 
(arguing that because people tend to anthropomorphize robots, we should consider granting some 
kinds of legal protections to robots). 
228. See Calo, supra note 24. 
229. See Yann Leroux, An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior. Fritz Heider & Marianne 
Simmel. 1944, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9TWwG4SFWQ. 
230. Victoria Woollaston, Is It Cruel to Kick a Robotic Dog? Google Video Reignites Debate 
over Whether Machines Should Be Treated Like Living Animals, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 16, 
2015, 7:56 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2955544/Would-kick-robotic-dog-
Google-video-regnites-debate-machines-treated-like-living-animals.html. 
231. Jonathan Soble, A Robotic Dog’s Mortality, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/technology/robotica-sony-aibo-robotic-dog-mortality.html. 
232.  Doree Armstrong, Emotional Attachment to Robots Could Affect Outcome on Battlefield, 
UW TODAY (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washington.edu/news/2013/09/17/emotional-attachment-
to-robots-could-affect-outcome-on-battlefield/; Meghan Neal, Are Soldiers Getting Too Emotionally 
Attached to War Robots?, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/ 
blog/are-soldiers-getting-too-emotionally-attached-to-war-robots. 
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information to a higher, more female-like voice.
233
 
These stories and studies suggest that human-robot interaction will 
operate at a higher level of social attachment and engagement than our 
interactions with, say, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. 
Companies can and will use robot faces, voices, and movements to gain 
human trust. One form of boundary management is to evaluate how 
much one can rely on the person to whom one is talking. If robots can 
manipulate our assessment of the strength of our relationships with 
them, then legislators or courts may wish to step in to strengthen those 
boundaries through law.
234
 
The Internet of Things, or adding sensors and connectivity to regular 
household objects, raises a perhaps more immediate version of a similar 
problem. If people are surrounded at home by objects that read to them 
as physical objects rather than cameras—such as the smart refrigerator—
then they may continue to boundary manage as though their home 
objects were not recording. While robots may manipulate human 
emotions to gain trust, smart objects may manipulate human reactions by 
remaining calculatedly invisible. Legislators may wish to step in to 
either require some form of repeated notice, to enable appropriate 
boundary management in formerly private spaces, or may again wish to 
preserve certain genres of boundary management to prevent undesirable 
behavioral shifts by banning recording. 
Smart objects also raise the interesting question of whether other-
sense-employing recorders raise a new kind of notice issue. People adapt 
their behavior when they believe they are being watched—and a pair of 
eyes can cue that watching is occurring.
235
 But are people able to adapt 
their behavior appropriately if the observation takes place on a different 
sensory dimension—such as, for example, heat-sensing? We may end up 
finding that notice works to enable effective boundary management with 
respect to certain kinds of information-gathering, but not with respect to 
other, non-visual or non-auditory forms. We may find that we are not 
able to boundary manage well when the breach takes place using other 
senses. 
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This Article proposes that we should understand the government 
interest in preventing others from looking through walls and from having 
a perfect memory as the same underlying interest in enabling or 
preserving boundary management. Courts can be sympathetic to this 
interest. As new technologies raise new boundary management 
challenges, legislators should be more aware of the interests they wish to 
protect. 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding privacy as boundary management certainly is not 
limited to the private surveillance context. The boundary management 
conception of privacy could, and at least occasionally does, work in the 
Fourth Amendment context as well.
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But when it comes to laws governing surveillance by private actors, a 
boundary management framework fits particularly well. It helps explain 
both what is happening in these laws, and how they might be improved 
to better serve a legitimate legislative interest. Boundary management as 
a framework benefits from being descriptively accurate, and provides 
theoretical guidance to prevent piecemeal laws and guide the scope of 
new laws. In addition, the framework sets up privacy laws to be 
weighed, as they inevitably will be, against other values such as freedom 
of speech. 
Reconciling the burgeoning right to record with the government’s 
ability to govern intrusive information gathering is necessary as we 
move from a world of photographs and cellphone recordings to one 
where individuals are increasingly watched and quantified by drones, the 
Internet of Things, and even household robots. Real-world information 
capture will only become more prevalent; the physical spaces where we 
retreat from the online world will become less and less private, and the 
physical tactics we use to shield ourselves will become less and less 
effective. The problems of information privacy are increasingly 
appearing in the physical world, returning us to Warren and Brandeis’s 
original fear that we will be recorded when we wish to be let alone. 
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